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INTRODUCTION
“Welcome to the best restaurant in town” was the byline of the
advertisement in the local newspaper. A restaurant named Panera
was to commence business in Tippasandra, Bangalore, India, with a
menu that included chat, biryani, and kebabs. Panera Bangalore had
no relationship with the American chain with the same name. At the
time the advertisement appeared, Panera Inc., the American entity,
had no interest in India, and hence, there was no registration for the
name in India. The Indian entity registered the trademark (mark) by
applying for registration with the Indian Patent & Trademarks Office
(IPTO) for a large array of goods, including coffee; chai (a local
Indian drink made with milk and black tea); flavored bakery
products; frozen products, such as ice creams and flavored ice;
insignias; t-shirts; caps; toys; and more. Importantly, the name
Panera was never used or advertised in India until the advertisement
appeared from a local user from India, and the restaurant opened at
the time the IPTO accepted the application or granted the
registration.1
Nilgiris is a famous chain of grocery franchises that has stores
in all major cities in India, as well as in other major Asian cities.2 The
Nilgiris trademark is distinct and enjoys great reputation within
1 This is a fictional situation outlined to help contrast the effects in both jurisdictions. But
the names of the marks are famous in their respective countries of first use with spill-over
reputation in other nations. Spill-over reputation results when a mark gains reputation and
recognition in a territory essentially from use in another territory. Thus, for example, Apple
becomes known in Timbaktu from the reputation of the mark outside Timbaktu even if Apple
products are not sold within the market.
2 Store Locator, NILGIRIS [https://perma.cc/HD4Q-D7JN].
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India. As the Indian community in the United States increased,
Nilgiris planned to tap into the market in the United States. Market
research from the New York area, unfortunately, revealed the mark
was used by a Ms. Patel, an American citizen of Indian origin, who
was unrelated and unconnected to the owners of the Nilgiris mark.
Ms. Patel, however, was familiar with the Nilgiris mark, its stores,
and its popularity amongst consumers in India. Further research
indicated that when Ms. Patel realized that there were no Nilgiris
stores in the United States, she started a small store in her
neighborhood, Grapevine, New York, to sell spices to the Indian
community under the Nilgiris name. Lacking creativity, Ms. Patel
adopted a font, style, and color identical to the original Nilgiris mark
of India for her store. Several Indian immigrants from the Grapevine
area, familiar with the original Nilgiris mark, embraced the store on
the assumption that the store was either authorized by, or connected
with, the Indian entity. Capitalizing on this familiarity, Ms. Patel
carefully selected and packaged her wares such that they bore a close
resemblance to the products sold by the Indian chain. Naturally, the
store flourished. In view of her store’s success, Ms. Patel successfully
applied to the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO)
and obtained a trademark registration for Nilgiris in the United
States.3
In the particular case above, the original Indian owner of the
Nilgiris mark had not used the mark in the United States at the time
Ms. Patel decided to capitalize on its fame. Historically, under
common law, use was central to determining priority. That is, the
extent of protection was based on the use of the mark in the

3 Famous marks enjoy wide recognition within a jurisdiction such that the reputation and
distinctiveness of the mark to function as a source identifier are stronger when compared to a
typical registered mark. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Spill-Over Reputation: Comparative Study
of India & the United States, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 326 (2019). Within the United States, famous
marks are protected as part of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. See Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730–32 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1125). Famous marks enjoy dilution protection in addition to protection against
infringement within the United States. Famous marks in the United States are those that have
acquired fame within the United States. Such marks are different from well-known marks, which
enjoy a spill-over reputation from use in another jurisdiction. The discussion in this Article is
about famous foreign marks that have acquired fame and are well-known in another country.
International conventions such as the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement define
protection for well-known marks. Such marks enjoy transborder reputation in jurisdictions
where the product or service is not marketed. See Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property art. 6bis, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intelectual
Property Rights art. 15, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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territory/market as a source identifier of the goods or services of a
particular firm.4 A trademark owner’s right over a mark was based
on the notion of associating the first user’s investment to create the
association between the goods and the used mark.5 With the
evolution of the more contemporary law and economics-based
approach, legal doctrines from courts in this area of law focused on
promoting economic efficiency.6 Under this theory, optimal use of a
mark in the market required that only one person use it as a source
identifier.7 Meanwhile, scholars like Professor McKenna theorize
that in the trademark context, courts were not pursuing economic
efficiency per se. Instead, courts focused on how trademarks can
improve “the quality of information in the marketplace.”8 Soon,
modern trademark law moved further and beyond from both the
point of economic efficiency, as well as the quality of trademarks, to
the value-add function. Basically, courts tried to fundamentally
determine whether and how a trademark can add value. The role of
use of a trademark as a mechanism to add value remains critical to
lend context to the development of this area of law, especially in the
United States. The use of the mark was important for the owners to
prove the link between the producer and the quality of goods in the
marketplace. Similarly, consumers satisfied with a product could use
a manufacturer’s mark to find the products in the market—thus, the
value in the trademark.9 Importantly, the correlation between use
and value of a mark complemented the role of one with the other.
Indeed, the use theory enjoyed immediate judicial acceptance
and soon became foundational in American trademark law even as
the concept of use lost its central position in the rest of the world. As
such, trademark use became a prerequisite to establish priority.
Similarly, use became important to prove confusion. The central
focus on use in American trademark law was such that the type of
use dictated the type of liability.10 For example, use in a nonStephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 759–60 (1990).
Id.
6 But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841–42 (2007) (“[C]ourts simply lacked the necessary sophistication to
articulate the true bases of their decisions. The law and economics scholars then relied on this
descriptive account to lend legitimacy to their normative conclusions; economic analysis not only
explained legal doctrines, but efficiency was the right goal for the law to pursue.”).
7 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 266 (1987).
8 McKenna, supra note 6, at 1842.
9 Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 270; see also McKenna, supra note 6, at 1842.
10 Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007).
4
5
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trademark context can result in immunity or a defense from
liability.11 Professors Dinwoodie and Janis assert that the use theory
became all pervasive in trademark law; indeed, they assert that use
became an “all-purpose device by which to immunize a diverse set of
practices from even potential liability for trademark infringement.”12
Finally, Dinwoodie and Janis conclude that the use theory limits the
reach of trademark law such that it has helped the creation of several
defenses ultimately limiting the rights of trademark owners.13 That,
in turn, led courts to further construct the use doctrine to create
defenses limiting the rights of the owner.14
In contrast, Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley offer a compelling
articulation of the trademark use theory, although in the limited context
of use of trademarks on the internet. They find that courts have tended
to dispense with the use limitation resulting in expanding the scope of
the rights of the trademark owners.15 The consequence of this expansion
has resulted in liability to defendants who did not use the mark as a
source identifier.16 A classic example, also discussed by Dogan and
Lemley, is the decision in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp.,17 which demonstrates how the use doctrine was
applied to increase or broaden a trademark owner’s rights by decrying
the use of a protected mark in a manner that clearly dissociated the
mark from the defendant’s service.18
This contrasting view of the application of the use doctrine and its
varying role in either limiting the use of trademark rights or, alternately,
expanding the scope of rights, presents a policy conundrum. Courts
have seemingly contributed to both these perspectives without any
larger purpose.19 Hence, the use theory, as applied by courts within the
11 Id. at 1599–1602; see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer
Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 779 (2004).
12 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 10, at 1600.
13 Id. at 1600–02.
14 Id. at 1619.
15 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 11, at 779.
16 Id. at 780.
17 See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
18 See also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
19 See Playboy Enters., 354 F.3d at 1024–34; 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com Inc., 414
F.3d 400, 403 (2d Cir. 2005); Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Off. Sols., Inc., 326 F.3d 687
(6th Cir. 2003) (broadening the meaning of trademark use such that it included more parties
within a larger liability zone even when these parties did not offer their own products or services
under the mark). But see Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 10, at 1600–02 (offering examples that
highlight how the use doctrine has helped limit the reach of trademark law in a number of
different contexts); Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005) (providing
an example of where courts have focused on the question of whether a use is trademark use to
not fully go into the question of confusion).
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United States, varies and has not resulted in any appreciable systematic
end.20 Indeed, Dinwoodie and Janis independently conclude that the use
theory is fundamentally flawed; as an independent tool, the use theory
has demonstrably lacked the ability to either broaden or, alternately,
limit the rights of the owner.21
None of the above has sufficiently prevented the current trend
within the United States to revive the focus on the use of trademark to
determine a mark’s ability as a source indicator.22 Professor Roberts, in
a 2019 article, makes the case that “use as a mark” is important for
trademark protection and advocates that the goals of trademark law will
be better served by combining “use as a mark” analyses with
distinctiveness assessments.23 She asserts that while distinctiveness is an
important aspect of trademark law, the use as a mark paradigm has been
relegated to a secondary position resulting in the granting of protection
for marks that may be distinctive but would fail the use as a mark test.24
The conundrum that courts have faced in the United States to
delineate the role of the use doctrine is palpable, especially when faced
with conflicting principles dealing with international obligations. On
the one hand, courts have continuously broadened the scope of rights
based on use of the trademark by tying use with consumer confusion
such that any use, whether as a trademark or otherwise, that results in
confusion could lead to liability.25 In doing so, courts have recognized
and expanded or broadened the concept of use of a mark as a brand or
source identifier.26 On the other hand, courts have tended to dissociate
or even limit the use doctrine such that, even without any use, a
trademark owner could get rights based on intent to use or, in some
cases, based on recognition under the famous marks doctrine.27

See also 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 488–90.
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 10, at 1667.
22 See Alexandra J. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1977, 1979–80
(2019).
23 Id. at 1981–82.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 2017; see also Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 10, at 1613–14; Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Better
Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (providing an example where the question was
whether the defendant placed or used the plaintiff’s trademark in a manner that indicated source
or origin).
26 See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 10, at 1613 (“But source-identification cannot occur
absent use.”); see also Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062
(9th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that notwithstanding the fact that there was no source confusion,
it was the use of “MovieBuff” that resulted in improper benefits).
27 Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 10, at 1643.
20
21
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Similarly, use as a mark becomes secondary to fame in the context of
famous marks being diluted.28
Conflicting policy objectives on the role of use, juxtaposed over
interludes from international prescriptions, have consequently
confused courts, which have struggled to succinctly determine the role
of use. While the concepts of use, put forward by courts within the
United States, are independently worthy of separate considerations, the
issue becomes more complicated when use intersects with fame in the
context of well-known marks. This is true of courts in the United States
as well as in countries where the United States Trade Representative has
managed to impose its prescriptions. Within the United States, for
example, the Ninth Circuit’s position in Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v.
Dallo & Co., regarding whether famous marks should be used
territorially in order to be protected, contrasted with the Second
Circuit’s position in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. on the same question.29
The result was an overflow of issues attempting to delineate the
limits of the role of use, including the “use as a mark” doctrine. It has
increasingly shifted the focus of trademark law from being more
consumer-focused into a more trade-based inquiry of how use, or
sometimes even nonuse, can affect the rights of trademark owners. The
conundrums and conflicts that prevail locally did not prevent the
United States from exporting a perverse version of the doctrine to other
countries using the trade regime. Two mechanisms have been deployed
successfully to export to other countries a line of analysis that is largely
in sync with industry preferences but is divorced from a well-grounded
policy analysis. The first is the World Trade Organization and the
second is the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
Harmonization of trademark law by the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994 of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) requires that principles of national
treatment will result in the WTO members treating foreign marks just

28 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Dilution by blurring occurs when the distinctiveness of
a famous mark is impaired by association with another similar mark or trade name with or
without a specific use component in a trademark sense. Id.
29 While the Ninth Circuit clearly recognizes that fame may be obtained by a foreign mark
outside the United States and that such fame may clearly be recognizable by consumers within
the United States in a manner that accrues rights to the owner of the mark, the court,
nevertheless, refuses to grant rights by deploying the use theory. On the other hand, the Second
Circuit refuses to recognize, and thus, grant any rights within the United States, for fame obtained
outside the United States by a foreign mark—emphasizing the use requirement within the United
States. Compare Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004), with
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), and La Societe Anonyme des Parfums le
Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495 F.2d 1265, 1270 (2d Cir. 1974) (requiring either a registration or
use of the mark in the United States to assert rights over the mark within the United States).
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as well as national marks.30 Second, the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement has
been abused by agencies such as the USPTO and USTR to unrealistically
export policies. That is, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative advises countries on trade issues from the specific
vantage of what is good for American business in a manner that is
nonchalant to local realities and completely blind to the impact on the
advised country.31 In turn, the policy prescriptions that are peddled by
the USTR are adopted by local courts despite conflicting economic
indicators or outcomes using the excuse of harmonization of that area
of law.
Interestingly, judicial decisions from India, influenced by the
USTR position, such as the Milmet Oftho or Whirlpool decisions,32
remain seminal within India on the question of well-known marks.
These decisions have firmly posited the precedency of well-known
marks such that territorial use is not required for marks that carry spillover reputation from another jurisdiction to be protected within
India.33 The lack of emphasis on use resulted in a harmonized
trademark law in India favoring foreign “well-known” marks. The
biggest beneficiary of the lack of focus of the Indian jurisprudence on
use was the United States. Thus, in the context of well-known marks,
several judgments from India refused to emphasize the need for local
use of the mark to get protection.34 The decisions are inapposite to the
30 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, art. 7. TRIPS seeks to reduce distortions and impediments
to international trade by promoting adequate protection of IP rights. The TRIPS preamble
emphasizes strengthening international commitment to IP reform. Id.
31 See, e.g., The India-US Trade Policy Forum (Tpf) to Be Held in Delhi, LEXORBIS (Nov. 14,
2014),
https://www.lexorbis.com/the-india-us-trade-policy-forum-tpf-to-be-held-in-delhi
[https://perma.cc/WM4P-M4XA]; Amiti Sen, “Use the WTO System Effectively,” HINDU BUS.
LINE (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/use-the-wto-systemeffectively/article9571512.ece [https://perma.cc/D8ZY-NTAM]; 19 U.S.C. § 2242; OFF. OF U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT 2–3 (2005) (“The United States is committed to a
policy of promoting increased intellectual property protection. In this regard, we are making
progress in advancing the protection of these rights through a variety of mechanisms, including
through the negotiation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). . . . Another opportunity we are using
to strengthen the protection and enforcement of intellectual property is the increasing number
of Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) negotiations with several countries in
regions such as the Middle East and Asia. . . . For example, USTR examines IPR practices through
the implementation of trade preference programs, such as the ongoing Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) reviews of countries, including Brazil, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Russia,
and Uzbekistan.”). “A Special 301 investigation is similar to an investigation initiated in response
to an industry Section 301 petition, in some circumstances.” Id. at 14.
32 N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., (1996) 5 SCC 714 (India); Milmet Oftho Indus. & Ors. v.
Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
33 In both instances, the product was not well-known in India and carried its reputation from
use abroad. See N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., (1996) 5 SCC 714 (India); Milmet Oftho Indus.
& Ors. v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
34 See discussion infra Part III.
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decisions from the United States courts, such as Grupo Gigante or ITC
v. Punchgini, where the requirement of territorial use posed the biggest
challenge for foreign marks that are already well-known within the
United States.35 Although Indian trademark law is theoretically fully
harmonized with the terms of the TRIPS Agreement, the United States’
emphasis on local use to protect well-known foreign marks
disadvantages foreign marks. While it is true that the use doctrine is a
central tenet of trademark law, the crossroads between well-known
marks and the use doctrine deserve much attention within the United
States to fulfill the need for extending national treatment to foreign
trademarks. Meanwhile, the USTR exports a position abroad regarding
protecting well-known foreign marks that dissociates use by
emphasizing “global” fame.36 Embracing this position largely
disadvantages member states because it protects foreign marks, very
often to the detriment of a local user.
Thus, the policy on use when viewed in the context of the
prescriptions from harmonized trade regimes creates a set of
intertwined issues that deserves more attention.37 This Article will shed
more light on issues relating to the use of a mark that has a transborder
reputation. The distinctions presented remain unique given that the
harmonized regime is limited by territorial jurisprudence of each
member country. My contributions here highlight the limitations of
emulating a system styled akin to the law in the United States in a
situation where the use of a mark intersects with fame that transcends
the use within a boundary.
This Article focuses on use and its interjections into the
harmonized trade regime, as it relates to trademark law and correlates
that with the use doctrine in the limited context of protecting a mark
that carries transborder reputation into countries where the mark is not
used.38 Focusing on use per se or, alternately, completely dismissing the
use criterion, can create disparate results. In the context of well-known
marks that enjoy transborder reputations, the issues from either not
including clear requirements or limits for the use requirement can
exacerbate and skew the results creating an imbalanced regime of
35 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); ITC Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
36 See discussion infra Part V.
37 See SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN, PATENT AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
167 (2012). Harmonization was meant to eliminate the legal differences that exist in the form of
protectionist policies and was conceived to reduce the barriers to trade. Id.
38 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154. The World Trade Organization, established under the Marrakesh Agreement,
consists of countries that are parties to the Uruguay Round Agreements of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Id.
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protection. While Apple as a trademark may deserve protection without
use in a jurisdiction based on fame alone, the same cannot be said of a
less well-known brand such as Land-O-Lakes outside of the United
States. Recognizing that the role of use creates animated policy
concerns, some of which may intersect with the role of fame in the
context of transborder reputation, this Article will delve into how
exporting the United States system, which remains unclear to begin
with, to other countries has created disparate results resulting in public
policy concerns. Examples of such public policy concerns include
instances when a foreign mark, unused or abandoned, in a jurisdiction
such as India, is protected by courts jeopardizing a good faith local
user.39 In India, for instance, courts have extended protection to marks
based purely on fame abroad even when the foreign user never used the
mark in India or, alternately, used and abandoned the mark.40 The
consequence has been a steady broadening of the scope of rights of
foreign trademark owners, especially to the detriment of local good
faith–user defendants. Thus, a seeming judicial enthusiasm to fulfill
international obligations was apparent. Consequently, courts in India
have tended to completely dissociate the strong foundational role of use
within trademark law and refused to balance use with fame.
This Article highlights the abuse of TRIPS, as outlined by Ruth
Okediji, especially when the trade regime was exported to poorer
nations.41 In essence, it raises public policy concerns when government
officials who are either ignorant or corrupt adopt a system that is
harmful to national interests in their zeal to abide by international
obligations; an example of this proposition is demonstrated below in
the context of the conflicts from protection of well-known marks as part
of the international efforts to harmonize trademarks law and the role of
the use doctrine. To do so, this Article examines protection of foreign
marks in two jurisdictions, India and the United States, to identify
global public policy concerns that have national implications. First, this
Article debunks the myth that harmonization would result in trading
partners extending reciprocal treatment.42 Inapposite to the touted
position, this Article uses the well-known marks example to outline
disparate outcomes that ensue when focusing on use as a source
indicator in a harmonized system. Second, in highlighting how
harmonization has not resulted in uniformity or predictability
RAGAVAN, supra note 37, at 324.
See infra text accompanying note 179.
41 See Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual Property Relations:
Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 194 (2014).
42 See generally Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law,
36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 93 (2003).
39
40
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internationally, in identifying and recognizing well-known trademarks,
this Article discusses how a lack of predictability under a harmonized
system has raised strong public policy and economic outcomes that may
be detrimental to some markets but beneficial to others.43 Also, the
United States and India are trading partners, which comports to an
expectation that the rules of reciprocity would dictate comparable or
similar rules to govern such disputes.44
Fully realizing and acknowledging the policy confusions involving
the use and the well-known marks doctrine, this Article focuses on the
contrasting set of issues that emerge from exporting a version of the use
doctrine as a solution to conform to the harmonized prescriptions
under the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, Part I of this Article begins with an
outline of the envisaged role for use in international trade agreements
for trademarks, especially focusing on the contrasting requirements
involving protection of well-known trademarks. Well-known marks are
those that are typically protected in one territory under national
trademark laws and become well-known outside of the protected
territory.45 Part II sets the framework to appreciate well-known marks
and the type of global protection envisaged for these marks. Part II also
discusses issues within the framework of famous marks in the United
States. In doing so, this Part frames the interplay of the traditional “use”
doctrine within the existential tensions of famous marks with the
territoriality doctrine. Part III outlines India’s trademark laws and
precedents as an example to examine the protection extended for wellknown trademarks, while Part IV presents the contrast between India’s
governing statutory provisions and the judicial posture on foreign
trademarks with that of the United States. This Part traces how the
United States practices the exact opposite of what it preaches to
developing countries. Part V traces the abuse of TRIPS, by presenting
India’s recognition for well-known marks, which has been dictated by
repeated pressures from the USTR and presents the resulting public
policy concerns. Until recently, arguably in an effort to conform to the
USTR’s position of well-known marks, India has disregarded the
jurisprudential tensions between the doctrines of territoriality and the
protection for famous marks, much to its own detriment. Meanwhile,
the United States, a strong proponent of protection for its well-known
trademarks abroad, has rarely, if ever, extended the same treatment to
See discussion infra Part V.
See generally Parisi & Ghei, supra note 42.
45 See, e.g., All You Need to Know About “Well-Known Trademarks,” IP & LEGAL FILINGS
(May 11, 2019), https://www.ipandlegalfilings.com/all-you-need-to-know-about-well-knowntrademarks?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=LinkedInintegration [https://perma.cc/9MYL-NMLQ].
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famous foreign trademarks.46 In conclusion, a coherent approach will
have to necessarily involve some level of flexibility to determine and
delineate fame of a foreign trademark in each jurisdiction within the
context of the market in question.
I. COMPETING PRESCRIPTIONS ON TERRITORIAL USE AND SPILL-OVER
REPUTATION
This Part outlines the competing principles from the international
intellectual property regime by highlighting the traditional use doctrine
and its role in the international trademark regime. The discussion
begins with how nationally within the United States, the “use” doctrine
tended to dominate the basic principles behind trademark protection.
From there, this Part discusses the minimized role of the use doctrine
in international agreements when dealing with a well-known
trademark.
A.

The Use Requirement and Its Relationship with Territoriality

Typically, like all intellectual property laws, trademark law remains
territorial.47 The territoriality principle comports with the requirement
that all intellectual property rights, including trademark rights, are
subject to the larger international principle that respects the sovereignty
of each country. Thus, each country’s trademark law is subject to the
framework designed and laid out in that country’s statute. In its
territorial sense, sovereign governments extend protection to
trademarks within their territorial boundaries.48 The concept behind
the territoriality doctrine is that each country provides rights that are
effective within its respective territory.49 Thus, “a trademark has a
separate legal existence under each country’s laws.”50

See discussion infra Part V.
See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923); see also Kristin Zobel, The Famous
Marks Doctrine: Can and Should Well-Known Foreign Marks Receive Trademark Protection
Within the United States?, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 148 (2008).
48 See James Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in American
Trademark Law, 59 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 451, 457 (2009) (discussing the territorial nature of
trademark law).
49 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:1
(5th ed. 2021); see also Faris, supra note 48, at 453 n.15.
50 Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
46
47
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Typically, use within a country is the basis for creating rights
territorially.51 Trademarks symbolize to the consumer the domestic
reputation from the use of the marks.52 That is, “use of a mark outside
a country does not give the user any rights to use the mark, or to stop
others from using it, in that country.”53
In the United States, to provide protection within the country, the
first to use gets the rights.54 Notably, priority of use is important for
trademark protection within a territory. That is, protection under
common law, as well as under the Lanham Act, begins from the time of
first use of the trademark.55 Thus, between many users, the first user
gets priority of rights. Between several claimants, use of the mark is the
easiest way to determine rights by focusing on priority of use. Known
as the doctrine of priority, the tenet that forms the basis of the doctrine
dictates that the first in time to use the trademark gets the right to use
it.56 Thus, the principle of first in time equals first in right.57 The priority
of trademark rights in any country is dependent solely upon priority of
use in that country.
The limits of geographic use of unregistered marks were first
discussed in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.58 The same
trademark, Rex, was used by two different parties in different locations
for over twenty-five years.59 The trademark was used over different,
albeit related, products: medicine to treat dyspepsia and blood
purifiers.60 The Supreme Court noted that the rule of priority did not
help either user and, hence, focused on the good faith use in a geography
to limit rights of parties.61 Basically, when the same mark is used by
different parties, in good faith, over goods belonging to the same class
but in separate markets remote from each party’s operation, the Court
felt that the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant,
Id.
See Faris, supra note 48, at 457 n.39.
53 L. Donald Prutzman, The Territoriality Principle and Protection for Famous Marks in the
Americas, 20 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 106, 106 (2007).
54 Faris, supra note 48, at 456–57.
55 William Jay Gross, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, 44 U. MIA. L. REV. 1075,
1080–81 (1990); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1057. But see 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). This Section allows parties
with a “bona fide intention” to use a trademark to obtain a federal registration regardless of proof
of actual use. Id.
56 Geri L. Haight & Philip Catanzano, The Effects of Global Priority of Trademark Rights, 91
MASS. L. REV. 18, 19 (2007).
57 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW
AND POLICY 438–42 (5th ed. 2018).
58 See generally United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
59 Id. at 94–95.
60 Id. at 94.
61 Id. at 100.
51
52
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unless the second party knew or ought to have known about the
existence of the first party and knowingly appropriated or intended to
appropriate the benefit of the reputation of his goods either for his own
benefit or to the detriment of the other.62 The Supreme Court
established what is now called the Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine under
which the right to a trademark is obtained from the use in commerce of
the mark and not by mere adoption.63 Essentially, the Tea Rose doctrine
states that the first user of a common law trademark may not oust a
second but good faith user of an infringing mark from a market where
the first user’s products or services were not sold.64 Between two
unregistered users of a mark over goods in the same class, in the same
market, priority of use controlled. Contemporary decisions have
adopted the Supreme Court’s rationale in the Tea Rose doctrine, which
is that the owner of a common law mark may not get rights in markets
“where the mark signifies not his goods but those of another.”65
The Tea Rose doctrine emphasizes that territorial use and,
importantly, prior use in third-party territories or markets is
inconsequential to the determination of priority in any jurisdiction.66
Thus, goodwill and domestic reputation of a mark is gained from its
domestic use or presence. The territoriality and the priority doctrines,
in essence, preserve the rights of the first user (or registrant) of a
trademark within the territory.
Under the Lanham Act, registration of a mark provides
constructive notice within the United States.67 Therefore, a registered
mark is protected regardless of the area of actual use of the mark.68
Nevertheless, the principles of priority outlined in the Tea Rose doctrine
continue to be applied to registered trademarks. Thus, a trademark
owner’s right to expand into new territories is subject to the presence of
a prior (unregistered) user with sufficient goodwill in that market from
a time prior to the registration. However, a prior unregistered user of a

See id. at 101 (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916)).
Id. at 98; Nashrah Ahmed, Note, The Tea Rose-Rectanus Doctrine’s Good Faith Test, 9 AM.
U. BUS. L. REV. 77, 78–79 (2020).
64 See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc., v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc.,
257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Supreme Court established the Tea
Rose/Rectanus doctrine); Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. at 100–01; Hanover, 240 U.S. at 415.
65 See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc., 257 F.3d at 735 (citing Hanover, 240 U.S. at
416).
66 See, e.g., Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569–70 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Buti v. Perosa,
S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha,
754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985).
67 15 U.S.C. § 1072.
68 Ragavan, supra note 3 at 351. “In doing so, [constructive notice] effectively eliminates good
faith and lack of knowledge defenses otherwise available to a subsequent user.” Id. at 351 n.119.
62
63
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mark cannot exclude a registered owner from using the mark in a
territory that would fall within the zone of the “normal expansion of
business” of the registered user.69
Internationally, use is not the fulcrum to determine whether a
mark is capable of being a source identifier.70 For example, Article 15(1)
of the TRIPS Agreement states that “[a]ny sign, or any combination of
signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking
from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a
trademark.”71 Thus, use is not a requirement to qualify as a trademark.
The marks are generally required to be inherently distinctive, although,
under the Article, members may choose to recognize acquired
distinctiveness optionally where the mark is not inherently distinctive.
Article 15(3) specifically makes use of an optional criterion to
determine registrability of a mark.72 A mark is protected within a
territory based on either prior use or registration.73 But, to the extent
that some countries specifically focus on use, it is notable that use is not
a standard threshold under the international trademark regime.
Mandating use for registration can result in disparate results when it
comes to the protection of well-known marks, as the following
discussions demonstrate.
B.

Well-Known Marks

Globalization has resulted in trademarks used in one country to
become well-known in places where the goods or services bearing the
mark are not used or marketed.74 The question is whether trademarks
well-known in a jurisdiction can be protected by capitalizing on fame
alone. Protection for well-known marks has posed a challenge to the
traditional use-based notions of protection for trademarks.75

Id. at 351.
See generally id. (highlighting that use is not the test to determine the validity of a
trademark).
71 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, at 326.
72 Id.
73 Clark W. Lackert & Maren C. Perry, Protecting Well-Known and Famous Marks: A Global
Perspective, BUILDING & ENFORCING INTELL. PROP. VALUE, 2008, at 63,
http://www.buildingipvalue.com/08_global/63-66kingspalding.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LPYHMRW].
74 Id.
75 See generally id. Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, marks are considered
famous if they satisfy the factors established in the statute. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (outlining the protection of famous marks); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(2)(A) (defining what constitutes a famous mark).
69
70
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The following discussion outlines the international prescriptions
in treatises governing the protection of well-known marks to highlight
the underlying doctrinal contradictions that govern the protection of
such marks.76
At an international level, the Paris Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement treaties outline the protection for well-known marks, i.e.,
trademarks that are famous in countries or jurisdictions outside the
territory of the mark’s use and registration.
1.

Paris Convention

One of the earliest treaties to address the use of well-known marks
is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention).77 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention outlines that
member countries have the right, through national legislation, to reject
or cancel applications of registered marks, or to prohibit use of
trademarks that are confusingly similar to a well-known mark.78 The
Paris Convention did not specifically define the term well-known
trademark. However, Article 6bis outlines that any imitation,
translation, or reproduction of a trademark that is considered “by the
competent authority” to be well-known as being the mark of “a person
entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or
similar goods” is prohibited.79
Under the Paris Convention, marks in use in a first country should
be well-known in a second country where registration is sought such
that registration for use over identical or similar products in the second
country would result in a strong likelihood of confusion.80 But, the
question of how fame of a well-known mark impacted the registration
in a second country over merely related or dissimilar goods remained
unaddressed. Similarly, the “identical or similar goods” doctrine served
76 See H.R. 683; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). Factors such as distinctiveness of the mark, the
duration and extent of use of the mark, the duration and extent of publicity of the mark, the
geographical trading area in which the mark is used, the channels of trade for the goods or
services with which the mark is used, the degree of recognition of the mark, the nature and
extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties, and registration status of the mark are
examples of factors that are considered towards determining whether a mark is famous under
Title 15 in the United States. See generally Allan P. Hillman, Trademark Dilution: The Fame
Game, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 2006, https://www.shipmangoodwin.com/a/web/uqw9m47G7u2CT
tsta36D19/Xbww5/trademark_dilution.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2AJ-JLG9].
77 See Paris Convention, supra note 3.
78 Id. 21 U.S.T. at 1640, 828 U.N.S.T. at 325.
79 Id. (emphasis added); see also World Intell. Prop. Org., The Management of Internet Names
and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues ¶ 253 (Apr. 30, 1999).
80 See Paris Convention, supra note 3, 21 U.S.T. at 1640, 828 U.N.S.T. at 325.
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to limit the scope of protection of the well-known marks under the Paris
Convention.81 That is, service marks were not covered under this
Convention. Hence, each member country had the flexibility to define
fame.
Under the Paris Convention, the extent of fame required for a
mark to be considered well-known was not elaborated. Similarly, the
limits, or even the criterion to determine the constituents of being wellknown, were all left undefined.82
2.

TRIPS Agreement

At the time of the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the
agreement that created intellectual property harmonization, the TRIPS
Agreement, under Article 2, incorporated all the substantive provisions
of the Paris Convention.83 Essentially, this meant that all of the
provisions that extended protection for trademarks under the Paris
Convention were extended to all the member countries of the WTO.
Well-known trademarks were addressed under Article 16(2) of the
TRIPS Agreement. Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement mandated
member states to establish statutes that protected well-known
trademarks to prevent third parties from using “identical or similar”
marks without authorization over “goods or services” and in a manner
resulting in likelihood of confusion with a registered trademark.84 Also,
unlike under the Paris Convention, the TRIPS Agreement included
protection for service marks.85 Consequently, Article 16 of the TRIPS
Agreement notes that “provisions relating to trademarks used over
goods in “Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply,
mutatis mutandis, to services.”86

81 Id. Separately, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been working
towards establishing a treaty addressing the protection of well-known and famous trademarks.
Thus, WIPO established a Standing Committee to deal with issues such as determining when a
mark becomes well-known. See World Intell. Prop. Org., Protection of Well-Known Marks, art.
2–3 (May 14, 1998).
82 Stylianos Malliaris, Protecting Famous Trademarks: Comparative Analysis of US and EU
Diverging Approaches—The Battle Between Legislatures and the Judiciary. Who Is the Ultimate
Judge?, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 45, 49 (2010).
83 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 301.
84 See World Intell. Prop. Org., supra note 81, art. 2.3 (“In determining whether a trademark
is well known, Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant
sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as
a result of the promotion of the trademark.”).
85 Id.; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 306.
86 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 306.

460

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:2

Next, the Article outlines suggestive factors that may be used to
determine whether a mark is “well-known.”87 One such factor relates to
whether in the relevant market, because of advertisements and
promotions, a mark used in one member country becomes wellknown.88 Under this provision, “promotion of the trademark” within
the second territory is required although the mark need not have been
used in the territory.89 Lastly, Article 16(3) of the TRIPS Agreement
expanded the scope of protection for well-known marks to dissimilar
(as opposed to identical) goods or services. Thus, (i) the goods or
services to which a trademark with fame from another country is
applied need not be identical or related, and (ii) use of well-known
marks from other countries on dissimilar goods were prohibited even
when there is no likelihood of confusion.90 Consequently, a well-known
mark from one country cannot be used by a third party in another
jurisdiction if a connection between the two marks can be established
from the promotion of the mark even if there is no confusion (the test
to prove infringement).91 The use of a well-known trademark on goods
or services in another country where the mark is not used or registered
can be a violation if: (a) such use is capable of falsely indicating a
connection between goods or services over which the mark is used; and
(b) the use can likely damage the interests of the owner of the registered
trademark.92 Thus, well-known trademarks benefitted from a wider
scope of protection such that the only test was a proof of a showing of
connection with goods and services of a well-known mark in the second
jurisdiction.93 Proof of connection was sufficient to prevent the use of
the well-known marks.94 That protection for well-known marks applied
to dissimilar goods or services broadened the scope of protection from
the original standard under which only use over “identical or similar”
goods were prohibited.95
Further, Article 16 of the TRIPS Agreement outlines the
constituents of a “well-known” mark; knowledge of the trademark “in
the relevant sector of the public,” including knowledge from promotion
of the trademark, was important to determine if the mark is well-

Id.
Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 See also Ragavan, supra note 3, at 332.
92 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 306.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.; see also World Intell. Prop. Org., Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks, art. 4(1)(b) (Sept. 29, 1999).
87
88

2021]

USE DOCTRINE IN TRADEMARK LAW

461

known.96 The term “relevant public” is undefined, and it is left to the
member countries to delineate the relevant market. Mere knowledge of
the mark from promotions is sufficient to prove fame, and neither local
use nor registration is required to be considered well-known.97
Additionally, Article 16(2)’s listed non-exhaustive factors, being
knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public and
knowledge in the Member country as a result of the promotion, could
be included in national legislation to better determine if a contested
mark is well-known.98
In addition to the above, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) has a recommended definition of “relevant
sectors of the public.” The recommendation broadly includes actual
and/or potential consumers; channels of distribution; and type of goods
and/or services to be taken into consideration.99 If the mark is
considered well-known in any one relevant sector of the public, WIPO
recommends that the member state consider the mark to be wellknown.100 That is, a member state may deem a mark as a well-known
mark, even if it is not otherwise generally and largely so considered. The
WIPO recommendations are a part of the non-binding Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of WellKnown Marks to assist member countries in establishing factors to
protect well-known marks.101
Importantly, the international regime underscores the need for
national laws to protect well-known marks based on “acquired fame,”
which naturally minimizes the role of use within the jurisdiction to
qualify for protection. The inbuilt flexibilities under TRIPS allow each
country to determine whether a mark protected in one jurisdiction can
qualify for protection in a second jurisdiction purely based on
reputation or fame dissociated with use. Unlike the modern trademark
law of the United States outlined by McKenna, globally, the value-add
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 306.
Id.
98 Id.
99 World Intell. Prop. Org., supra note 95, art. 2(2)(a).
100 Id. art. 2(2)(c).
101 Id. art. 2(2)(d). Under the WIPO Guidelines, a mark may be considered to be well-known
or famous if one or more of the considerations listed below applies. Such considerations include:
(a) the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the relevant sector of the public; (b)
the duration, extent, and geographical area of any use of the mark; (c) the duration, extent, and
geographical are of any promotion of the mark; (d) advertising or publicity and the presentation,
at fairs or exhibitions, of the goods and/or services to which the mark applies; (e) the duration
and geographical area of any registrations, and/or any applications for registration of the mark;
(f) the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark; and (g) the extent to which
competent authorities recognize the mark and the value associated with the mark. Id. art. 2.2–
2.10.
96
97
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over trademarks was not based on use per se, but also on fame with or
without use.102
II. GLOBALIZATION AND DOCTRINAL TENSIONS
The discussion above establishes that well-known marks are those
that embody a reputation or fame that transcends jurisdictions.
Considering that the fame of the mark has preceded actual use,
countries prefer to extend protection in recognition of the fame. Crossborder recognition for famous marks can also create reciprocity, which
is an important international law concept to encourage countries to
reciprocate privileges between member states. The following discussion
examines whether globalization has eliminated or exacerbated the
doctrinal conflicts associated with the protection of well-known foreign
trademarks.
A.

Fame’s Intersections with Territoriality and Priority Doctrines

The prescriptions of the international trade agreements and the
recommendations to extend recognition for a mark famous in one
jurisdiction to a second jurisdiction form an exception to the
territoriality principle, which is grounded on the use doctrine.
Protection for a mark based purely on its spill-over reputation from
another jurisdiction in which the mark is protected forms an exception
to the territoriality principle. In essence, recognition of a well-known
trademark results in national protection for property whose use and
benefits have essentially been outside of the country. The protection of
famous marks is not based on domestic use but on the reputational
value of a trademark outside of a territory. It breaks away from and
expands the traditional notion of trademark use as symbolizing quality
and preserving market integrity.103 It largely separates the notion of use
from reputation and recognition.104
One of the earliest examples of the tension between the operation
of the territorial use requirement and well-known marks is outlined in
the 1959 New York trial court decision Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc.105
102 Andrew Cook, Do As We Say, Not As We Do: A Study of the Well-Known Marks Doctrine
in the United States, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 413 (2009).
103 See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (6th ed. 2012).
104 See DAVID HAIGH, BRAND VALUATION: UNDERSTANDING, EXPLOITING AND
COMMUNICATING BRAND VALUES 9 (1998).
105 Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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It involved the use of the mark Maxim’s for a restaurant in New York.
Maxim’s was a well-known Parisian restaurant in operation since 1893,
which had no outlets in New York.106 The trial court found that Maxim’s
of New York used similar fonts and signage in a manner distinctly
evoking Maxim’s of Paris, including copying the red and gold décor
thereof and using Montmartre as part of its corporate name, all of which
were clear attempts to create an illusion of identity with Maxim’s of
Paris.107 The trial court carved an important exception to the principle
of territoriality in recognizing the French Maxim’s mark as a famous
mark.108 In enjoining the New York use, Vaudable enunciated that use
of a mark in one country (or territory) can result in gaining exclusive
rights in another country provided the mark has become famous in a
second jurisdiction.109 That is, the first to use within the territory
(territorial user) gets rights over the mark within the territory except
where the first territorial user’s mark has already acquired fame in a
different territory on account of use by a different user (defined as
“prior user of the mark”). Thus, the court differentiated between first
territorial user versus prior user of the mark. If the mark becomes
famous within the territory, but, nevertheless, the mark is a well-known
mark because of use by a prior user, the latter gets the exclusive rights
over the first territorial user of the mark. Accordingly, a prior user’s
mark, which is termed a well-known mark, enjoys a reputation in
(foreign) markets even before the prior user enters the market, owing
its fame to use in a different territory.
The reasoning of the court comports with an important policy
justification for trademark law, which recognizes the trademark
owner’s interest in not having “the fruit of his labor
misappropriated.”110 But, if an innocent national user is confronted
with a foreign famous trademark that has not been used within the
territory, protecting the famous foreign mark may run contrary to this
policy justification. Thus, when dealing with famous foreign marks, the
question of territoriality and priority takes a different form. Typically,
priority of use is limited to use within the territory.111 The question with
foreign marks is whether the priority of use in a third territory will
count towards local priority. That is, A uses the mark first

106 Id. at 334. “Plaintiffs have registered the mark Maxim’s with the United States Patent Office
for catering services and wines, and have merchandised and sold food products under that name
or a variant thereof in the United States.” Id.
107 Id.
108 Faris, supra note 48, at 462.
109 Vaudable, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
110 Faris, supra note 48, at 454.
111 See Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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internationally, except in Utopia, such that the mark becomes wellknown worldwide and acquires fame everywhere, including in Utopia.
Within Utopia, B uses and registers the mark first. On the question of
who gets priority in Utopia, traditional principles will dictate that the
first to use within Utopia, being B, gets the rights over the mark.
However, the doctrine of a well-known foreign mark can raise other
questions. For example, assume McDonald’s is not registered in Utopia
but remains well-known globally. Now, allowing a third party to register
the mark in Utopia based merely on priority of use within Utopia may
be unfair to McDonald’s, which may already enjoy a strong brand
reputation internationally. In the same vein, if McDonald’s cared about
the Utopian market, it arguably should have registered there more
quickly. If B had registered the mark in Utopia before McDonald’s
became famous, it would be unfair to B to let McDonald’s use its fame
outside of Utopia, some of which may have been acquired after B started
using the name in Utopia to capture the Utopian market, to push B, a
legitimate first territorial user, out.
The above example illustrates the spaghetti bowl of issues
presented in every country to define “fame” and its limitations when
confronted with a local user.
B.

Reciprocity and Universality Principles

Notwithstanding the above, protection for well-known foreign
marks conforms with and may be fully justified based on the
international law principles of reciprocity.112 Typically, in international
law and in international relations, the principle of reciprocity is
universally accepted as a basic foundational principle.113 Under this, a
state adopts a behavior symmetrical with, and in response to, that
adopted by another state.114 International customary law recognizes the
principle of reciprocity wherein trading parties will extend treatment
such as favors, penalties, or benefits toward each other.115 Thus, a
member recognizing a famous trademark of another member would
expect that the same treatment be meted to its famous trademarks by
the latter member.

112 See generally Odeen Ishmael, 41. Reciprocity in International Relations, ODEEN ISHMAEL
DIPL. (Aug. 19, 2013), https://odeenishmaeldiplomacy.wordpress.com/2013/08/19/41reciprocity-in-international-relations [https://perma.cc/4X3W-6ZF9].
113 See id.
114 Id.
115 Parisi & Ghei, supra note 42, at 94.
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Another important international law principle is termed the
“universality” doctrine, which provides that a mark indicates the same
source irrespective of the jurisdiction of the mark’s use.116 When
merchandise bearing a lawfully affixed trademark moves from one
country to another, “the merchandise would carry that mark lawfully
wherever it went” “and the mark cannot be deemed to infringe if the
merchandise” is “transported to another country where the exclusive
right to the mark was held by someone other than the owner of the
merchandise.”117
Generally, for the envisaged protection for famous marks to
operate reciprocally, countries should focus on fame rather than on
local use of the mark. Thus, exceptions for famous marks will be created
to the principle of territoriality, and by extension, to the principle of
priority of use. Under this construction, the first party to register a
trademark should get priority within the territory of use unless the mark
has established fame from the use of a prior user in a foreign territory.118
For instance, marks with a global reputation, such as Microsoft,
McDonald’s, or Apple, are examples of well-known marks. The
reputation or fame of these marks spreads beyond territorial boundaries
and enjoys a reputation even in countries where they may not be
present.
The question becomes more complicated where innocent users are
involved. For instance, it may be easy to expect that the same trademark
may be used over similar or comparable goods or services in different
parts of the world, innocently. For example, two different parties may
innocently use “Home Store” for stores that sell home products, one in
Oklahoma, United States, and one in Manchester, United Kingdom.
Under these circumstances, if one company goes into the territory of
the other, the famous mark doctrine might dictate if one mark has more
fame than the other. If not, the doctrine of priority will operate to limit
protection to respective owners within their respective geography or
territory of use. Thus, each trademark user/owner can peacefully use
the name within their respective territory of use, subject to conditions
and applicable statutory requirements.
The factum of globalization and the resulting ability to know of
trademarks from one jurisdiction in another even if they are not in use
has raised a fresh gamut of issues in this area. The lack of guidelines to
reasonably quantify the required fame to overcome a local user for
protection has exacerbated these issues. For example, the extent of the
MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at § 29.1.
Faris, supra note 48, at 456.
118 See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc., v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc.,
257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) (defining the Tea Rose doctrine).
116
117
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reputation of marks in another jurisdiction where they do not have
presence, such as Reliance, Macy’s, Nordstrom, or Cognizant
Technologies, is not as clear as that of Microsoft or Google. Under these
circumstances, each member country has struggled with creating the
well-known marks exception to the territoriality/priority question. That
is, while use dictated priority within a territory, the value-add of the
well-known mark exceptions from fame alone without use is unclear.
The discussions on India and the United States outlined in Parts III and
IV below serve as great examples to demonstrate the above proposition.
III. INDIA’S HANDLING OF TRANSBORDER REPUTATION
This Part outlines how India has protected well-known foreign
trademarks. India undertook the exercise of amending its trademark
statute119 after attaining WTO membership with a view to become
TRIPS compliant.120 In 1999, India first amended its trademark statute
to harmonize its trademark regime with the TRIPS Agreement. The
amended statute finally came into force in 2003.121
A.

India’s “Use” Doctrine and Broad Transborder Reputation

Historically, under the British trademark system, which was a
forerunner for the Indian Trade & Merchandise Marks Act of 1958, use
and registration within India was central to protecting trademarks. The
Indian trademark statute did not specifically address protection for
marks that enjoyed reputation within India on account of use outside
of India. Thus, trademark protection based on use or registration within
India was in line with the territoriality doctrine.122 Issues relating to
transborder reputation were dealt with under Section 27(2) of the Trade
Marks Act, 1958, which focused on territorial use to protect common
law rights over unregistered marks, such that an owner had a passingoff cause of action.123 Goodwill and local reputation of the mark were

The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (Oct. 17, 1958) (India).
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 3; see also India and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/india_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5T9L-R5VY];
Ragavan, supra note 3, at 334.
121 See The Trade Marks Act, 1999, § 1 (India).
122 See The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, §§ 2–3.
123 Id. § 27(2). “Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action against any
person for passing off goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in respect thereof.”
Id.
119
120
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the main tests or prerequisites to a successful passing-off action.124
These same tests were extended to marks with spill-over reputation
from use abroad.
One of the earliest instances was in 1986 when Gillette U.K.
Limited alleged infringement of its “7 O’CLOCK” trademark used on
safety razor blades.125 Notably, Gillette did not sell these blades within
India post-1958, when government regulations prohibited the import
of these razors, until 1982 when it re-entered the market.126 In 1985,
Gillette became aware of the defendant’s products and filed a lawsuit in
1986 to enjoin the defendant’s use of “7-Up” on safety razors.127 In
response, the defendants asserted that Gillette’s nonuse of the mark
from 1958 until 1982 resulted in a loss of reputation and goodwill of the
Gillette mark over the associated goods. Moreover, at the time 7-Up
razors entered the market, the defendants argued that Gillette’s rights
were deemed abandoned from nonuse.128 Thus, the defendants raised
the abandonment defense (loss of rights on account of nonrenewal of
trademark)129 to assert that Gillette either had no goodwill because of
nonuse starting in 1958, or, that plaintiff’s goodwill had been lost from
the date of nonuse.130 The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
issued an injunction against the defendants on the grounds that the
mark retained its distinctiveness within India and refused to accept the
abandonment defense. The court refused the loss of distinctiveness
argument on the grounds that the lack of commercial use was caused
by intervening restrictive government policies.131 Instead, the court
focused on advertisements in media that enjoyed a high level of
circulation within India.132 Interestingly, in refusing the defendant’s
requests, the court also focused on knowledge of the mark among
Indians who travel abroad.133
That this decision did not focus on use was exceptional. That it did
not address whether several years of nonuse amounted to abandonment
Id. §§ 47(1), 106.
Centron Indus. All. Ltd. v. Gillette U.K. Ltd., 1986 SCC Online BOM 350, ¶¶ 1, 2.
126 Id. ¶ 2.
127 Id. ¶¶ 4–7.
128 Id. ¶ 7.
129 Id. ¶¶ 7, 12, 13; see, e.g., The Trade Marks Act, 1999, §§ 25(3), 25(4), 26, 46 (India)
(dealing with nonuse of the trademark).
130 Centron Indus. All. Ltd., 1986 SCC Online BOM 350, ¶ 7. The plaintiffs had no goodwill in
the mark “7 O’CLOCK” because the goods manufactured by the plaintiffs had not been available
in India since 1958, and the goodwill, if any, stood extinguished. However, the defendants
acquired goodwill in respect to the mark “7 O’CLOCK” from 1982. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7.
131 Id. ¶¶ 13, 17.
132 Id. ¶ 7.
133 Id.
124
125
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makes the opinion deficient. Loss of rights from nonuse, termed as
abandonment, forms an important part of trademark jurisprudence.134
The case did not discuss the correlation between nonuse in a market
and consequential loss of rights both generally as well as in relation to
this dispute.
Interestingly, the 7 O’CLOCK mark was later adopted over
dissimilar goods: toothbrushes. In 1987, the Bombay High Court in a
Division Bench decision involving the Kamal Trading Company
considered the adoption of the 7 O’CLOCK mark over dissimilar goods,
namely, toothbrushes.135 Along the lines of the previous decision, this
bench too refused to conclude that the goodwill or the reputation was
lost because of nonuse of the mark from 1958 to 1982.136 When
presented with abandonment decisions from England, the court seemed
blind to the legal question, choosing instead to merely distinguish based
on the facts.137 The court considered a court of appeals decision from
England, which viewed the plaintiffs’ sale of about 5,000,000 cases of
Budweiser beer to military and diplomatic establishments as “sporadic
and occasional sales” not amounting to carrying on a business in
England, to refuse an injunction against the defendants’ use of the
mark.138 The court refused to acknowledge that Gillette suspending
business activities in India amounted to abandonment or was
reputation-destroying.139 These decisions broadened the concept of
goodwill for well-known marks to exclude use of the mark over
dissimilar goods but did so without creating a proper legal basis and by
measuring goodwill based on knowledge through advertisements.140
Overall, the Gillette decisions may be correct in asserting that
“goodwill” extends beyond the jurisdiction of a particular country,141
although the refusal to consider the implications of nonuse and
abandonment of the mark left a huge lacuna. Both Gillette decisions
were deficient in not defining: a) the constituents of fame; b) when fame
from one jurisdiction translates into goodwill in a second jurisdiction;
and c) what aspects of fame—advertisements, general public awareness
of the mark, or knowledge in “the relevant market”—translates into
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. A trademark is deemed abandoned if “its use has been discontinued
with intent not to resume such use. . . . Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie
evidence of abandonment. “‘Use’ of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.” Id.
135 Kamal Trading Co. v. Gillette U.K. Ltd., (1988) 8 PTC 1, ¶ 1 (India).
136 Id. ¶¶ 1, 11.
137 Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
138 Id. ¶ 10; Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Budejovicky Budvar N.P., [1984] F.S.R. 413 (Eng.).
139 Kamal Trading Co., 8 PTC 1, ¶ 11.
140 Id.; Centron Indus. All. Ltd. v. Gillette U.K. Ltd., 1986 SCC Online BOM 350, ¶ 7 (India).
141 Kamal Trading Co., 8 PTC 1, ¶ 11.
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goodwill in a legal sense in the second jurisdiction. Thus, the decisions
did not draw boundaries to establish the threshold of goodwill
especially when the mark has either not been used in the jurisdiction,
or when the mark has not been renewed and, thus, abandoned. These
broad deficient decisions became the precedents that set poor standards
in India.
Not surprisingly, the New Delhi High Court in 1991 followed these
decisions on a passing-off claim involving Apple Computers.142 Apple
Computers Inc. (Apple USA), which exported its products to India
since 1977, sued an Indian entity—Apple Computer Education—for
using a similar logo.143 While Apple USA had a favorable case based on
the strength of its mark, its sales in India, goodwill from the mark, and
bad faith use by defendant, the New Delhi High Court applied the
broadened standard from the Gillette decisions to dismiss use as a
prerequisite on the grounds that plaintiffs need not carry on business in
a jurisdiction before improper use of its name or mark can be restrained
by the court.144
Soon, the Indian Supreme Court followed the arguably myopic line
of thinking in 1996 involving the trademark of the Whirlpool
Corporation.145 The Whirlpool trademark was registered in India, on
February 22, 1956, in classes 7, 9, and 11 for use over several goods
including washing machines.146 The registrations lapsed on account of
nonrenewal in 1977.147 The defendant, meanwhile, registered the
“Whirlpool” mark for the same class of goods in 1986.148 Whirlpool
USA advertised its products in publications having circulation in India.
Notably, goods bearing the Whirlpool mark were only sold to United
States Embassy and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) offices and were thus subjected to limited use
within India.149
The Indian Supreme Court held that the use requirement was
satisfied from advertisements of the goods bearing the trademark even
if the goods were not sold in the market. The court dismissed the need
for the general public to know the association of the goods with the
Apple Comput. Inc. v. Apple Leasing & Indus., (1991) I.A. 7678 (India).
Id. ¶¶ 8, 17.
144 Id. ¶ 161.
145 N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., (1996) 5 SCC 714 (India).
146 N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., AIR 1995 Del 300, 302–04 (India).
147 Id. ¶ 3.
148 Whirlpool, 5 SCC 714. Whirlpool Corporation’s opposition was ultimately rejected, and
the trademark was registered in the defendants’ name. Id. When the appeal came before the
Supreme Court, Whirlpool Corporation’s petition to expunge the registration granted to the
defendant was still pending before the Trade Marks Office. Id.
149 Id.
142
143
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plaintiff.150 Arguably, without fully considering the successful
intervening registration of the mark by the local defendant, the court
held that, prima facie, the plaintiff was the prior user of the Whirlpool
trademark because the plaintiff used the mark globally since 1941.151
Basically, the court bought nonuse of the mark as an affirmative
argument favoring the plaintiff in adding that the nonuse allowed the
defendants to claim the mark from 1986 within India.152 In deciding that
Whirlpool trademark sustained its reputation and goodwill despite
nonuse and nonrenewal of the mark, the decision dissociates the use
requirement from considerations of spill-over reputation.153
The decision lacked a basis for protecting ownership rights when
the owner did not care to protect it within the country/territory.154
Similarly, the Indian Supreme Court did not define the relevant market
nor did the court venture into the question of establishing the threshold
or criterion to determine the constituents of fame or the associations
between the trademark use versus that of a well-known trademark to
distinguish famous marks from those that were not. Overall, the
judgments resulted in diluting the value of trademark registration, use,
and its associations with the territorial doctrine. India’s jurisprudence
seemed to favor the Dinwoodie and Janis position that the use theory is
essentially flawed.155
B.

Use Dissociations Favoring Foreign Marks

The Whirlpool decision, discussed above, became an important
precedent to dilute the doctrine of use; instead, it broadened protection
for marks with transborder reputation.156 The Indian Supreme Court’s
opinion in the Whirlpool decision set a new trend that largely favored
owners of well-known marks in India. Thus, subsequent cases followed
the holding of the Whirlpool decision which, in turn, firmly established

Id. (citing Faulder & Co. v. O. & G. Rushton, Ltd., (1903) 20 RPC 477 (India)).
Id.
152 Id.
153 See id.; see also N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., AIR 1995 Del 300, 302–04 (India).
154 See The Trade Marks Act, 1999, §§ 25–26 (India).
155 See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 10, at 1644 (“Courts have discounted the apparent
certainty of strict actual use in order to give effect to other values.”). “Pressures to adjust notions
of use to reflect the exigencies of particular historical moments are unlikely to subside.” Id. at
1644 n.203. In the cases discussed, India has seemingly ignored bright-line rules to find use in
extraordinary circumstances.
156 Nicky Jatana, Case Note, Did Whirlpool Make Its Mark in India?: N.R. Dongre v.
Whirlpool Corp., 10 TRANSNAT’L L. 331, 350 (1997).
150
151
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judicial recognition of transborder reputation dismissing the role of use
for trademarks.157
By 1997, another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
recognized transborder reputation of the Volvo mark by dismissing the
need for actual sale within India.158 The plaintiff, a well-known Swedish
multinational automobile company, which at that time had not
established their business in India, prevailed over a defendant, a local
Indian company, which had used the mark on their goods—mild steel
ingots.159
These judgments were great for foreign trademark owners. Alfred
Dunhill, for example, managed to secure rights over a trademark after
a local user used it for eleven years within India.160 Similarly, Rainforest
Cafe Inc., a restaurant chain from the United States, with no presence
or use or business or promotion in India, secured an injunction in its
favor in 2001 on the grounds that it would suffer irreparable harm to its
reputation.161 Similarly, in 2002, Jolene, the American cosmetic
company, which had no business activity in India at that time, prevailed
against a local defendant when a single judge of the Delhi High Court,
citing the Whirlpool decision, decided in favor of Jolene by issuing an
injunction against a local defendant who adopted an identical mark on
identical goods.162
The cost of courts refraining from the larger legal and economic
analysis to fully delineate the limitations of spilled-over reputation was
high for India and local defendants. The decisions arguably eroded the
need for foreign companies to prioritize the Indian market and register
their trademarks or market their products in India quickly. While
foreign investors paid more attention to markets that required use by
launching the products quickly, they could ignore the Indian market
given its enthusiasm to embrace foreign marks.
Courts in India simply failed to address the conflict and required
balance between the use doctrine, how use is critical for establishing

157 See Aktiebolaget Volvo of Swed. v. Volvo Steels Ltd. of Gujarat, (1998) 18 PTC 47 (India);
Rainforest Cafe Inc. v. Rainforest Cafe, (2001) 91 DLT 508 (India).
158 Aktiebolaget, 18 PTC 47, ¶ 61.
159 Id. ¶ 16.
160 Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Kartar Singh Makkar, (1999) 19 PTC 294 (India). Other cases where
the same issues have been dealt with include: Mars Inc. v. A.K. Gera, (2001) 94 DLT 906
(claimant’s “MILKY WAY” mark for confectionary products protected); Caterpillar Inc. v.
Mehtab Ahmed, (2002) 99 DLT 678 (claimant’s “CATERPILLAR” mark for footwear protected);
Pizza Hut Int’l LLC v. Pizza Hut India Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 26 PTC 208 (claimant’s “PIZZA HUT”
mark for restaurants protected); V & S Vin Spirit AB v. Kullu Valley Min. Water Co., (2005) 30
PTC 47 (claimant’s “ABSOLUT” mark for alcoholic and soft drinks protected).
161 Rainforest Cafe Inc., 91 DLT 508, ¶ 10.
162 Jolen Inc. v. Dr. & Co., (2002) 98 DLT 76 (India).
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priority, and the intersections and limitations of fame. Surprisingly,
courts also did not delve into the “fame” requirement exhaustively. For
instance, it is unclear if there is a difference between the reputation and
goodwill associated with say, the Apple mark, and the likes of Rainforest
Cafe and Jolene. Even if Jolene and Rainforest Cafe are famous and
fulfill the statutory requirement of fame within the United States,
should the fame requirement be different in a country like India where
these products are generally known to a much smaller segment of the
population? Did Indian courts not have an obligation to consider how
a “market” should be defined to determine the constituents of fame and
goodwill from a local or territorial perspective? The lack of reasoned
decisions and the implications therefrom are further outlined in the
next Section where courts consider trademarks of cough syrups and CD
titles as having benefitted from transborder reputation. Clearly, these
judgments from the Indian courts do not reflect economic efficiency
per se, along the lines of what Posner advocates and McKenna
criticizes.163 Instead, the judgments seem to focus on “improving” “the
quality of information in the marketplace,” arguably, although
protection for foreign marks that are not widely known cannot per se
contribute to the quality of information in the market.164 In all, the
Whirlpool decision is widely regarded as an attempt to appease the
United States, an issue further discussed as part of trademark’s
intersections with the trade regime in Part V.
C.

Well-Known Trademarks in Post-TRIPS Era

The enactment of the Trade Marks Act (TMA) in 1999 marked a
new era because it highlighted that statutory protection for a wellknown mark is not conditioned on use or registration in India.165 The
provisions of the TMA dissociated the use requirement for protecting

163 See Landes & Posner, supra note 7, at 265–66 (“Our overall conclusion is that trademark
law . . . can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic
efficiency.”).
164 McKenna asserts that one of the traditional core principles of trademark law is to protect
“the quality of information in the marketplace,” which is also absent in these decisions. McKenna,
supra note 6, at 1840.
165 Compare The Trade Marks Act, 1999 (India), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(iv) (“In
determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider
all relevant factors, including . . . [w]hether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.”).
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well-known marks based on local recognition.166 Section 11(9) of the
statute proscribed that the Registrar shall not deny protection for a wellknown mark on the grounds that the trademark has not been used,
registered, or that the trademark is not well-known to the public at large
in India.167 Not considering priority of local use to protect a well-known
foreign mark was seemingly in line with the WIPO joint
recommendations.168 The question of whether a prior foreign user of a
well-known trademark be given priority against a first local user of the
mark remained outstanding in India.
The non-exhaustive criteria for determining a well-known mark
under Section 11(6)169 includes knowledge or recognition of the mark
in the relevant section of the public; knowledge within India from
promotion of the mark; duration, extent, and geographical area of
promotion either from use or registration; and instances of successful
enforcement of rights over the mark.170 The market for the goods,
channels of distribution, and “the business circles dealing with the
goods or services, to which that trade mark applies” may be considered
as well.171 Thus, because the public at large need not know of a wellknown mark, it is left to the judiciary to define what constitutes “wellknown” and “the relevant public” to determine the extent of local fame
over the mark.
Under the amended Trademark Rules of 2017, parties may request
the Registrar to determine a trademark as well-known by filing a
relevant form.172 Parties should include evidence in support of their
claim173 although the Registrar can request additional documents174 and
invite oppositions, objections, or both from the general public.175 The
166 Compare The Trade Marks Act, 1999, § 11(8), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (requiring that the
trademark owner must show valid ownership of the famous mark as well as commercial use in
commerce of the mark that allegedly causes dilution of the famous mark). This law does not
require the mark to be registered in the United States in order to receive famous mark protection,
but it should be used in the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
167 The Trade Marks Act, 1999, § 11(9).
168 See World Intell. Prop. Org., supra note 79, ¶ 260.
169 The Trade Marks Act, 1999, § 11(6).
170 Id.
171 Id. § 11(7)(iii).
172 See Ministry of Commerce & Industry, G.S.R. 199(E) (Mar. 6, 2017) ¶ 124 (India).
173 Id. ¶ 124(1). Once the documents are filed, the Registrar will make a determination, based
on such documents and § 11(6)–(9) of the TMA, to determine whether the mark is well-known.
Id. ¶ 124(2).
174 Id. ¶ 124(3) (“For the purpose of determination, the Registrar may call such documents as
he thinks fit.”).
175 Id. ¶ 124(4) (“Before determining a trademark as well-known, the Registrar may invite
objections from the general public to be filed within thirty days from the date of invitation of
such objection.”).
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Registrar also has the power to change that status, subject to due
hearing, if circumstances change.176 A determination by the Registrar
that a mark is well-known entails publication in the trademark Journal
as part of the list of well-known trademarks maintained by the
Registrar.177 This is comparable to the Japanese practice of publishing
well-known trademarks.178 The extraordinary powers that trademark
Registrars wield with reference to either graduating or demoting a
trademark as being well-known provides a huge scope for foreign
influence over trademark registrars.179
The amendments laid the foundation for the judiciary to
underscore the doctrinal tension between territoriality and fame. But
the changes were neither immediate nor apparent. In 2004, in the
famous case of Milmet Oftho Industries & Ors. v. Allergan Inc., the
Indian Supreme Court dealt with an appeal from a local defendant over
the Ocuflox mark.180 The foreign plaintiff never used the mark in
India.181 Despite that, the court held that use in India was irrelevant if
the plaintiff was the first in the world market.182 The Indian Supreme
Court added that medical practitioners regularly travel abroad and
because Ocuflox is widely advertised, it likely acquired a worldwide

176 Id. ¶ 124(6) (“The Registrar may, at any time, if it is found that a trademark has been
erroneously or inadvertently included or is no longer justified to be in the list of well-known
trademarks, remove the same from the list after providing due opportunity of hearing to the
concerned party.”).
177 Id. § 124(5) (“In case the trademark is determined as well-known, the same shall be
published in the trademark Journal and included in the list of well-known trademarks
maintained by the Registrar.”). On March 6, 2017, the Trademark Rules, 2017, were put into
effect. Id. ¶ 1. Under the rules, the Indian Trade Marks Office maintained a list of well-known
marks, which were included based on a request by the owners of the marks provided they
presented valid proof. See OFF. OF CONTROLLER GEN. OF PATS., DESIGNS & TRADEMARKS, List of
Well—Known Trademarks (India), https://ipindia.gov.in/writereaddata/Portal/Images/pdf/wellknown-trademaks-updated-newone.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2YX-G9AB]. The Trade Marks
Office typically preferred a court order recognizing the mark as a well-known mark as valid proof
of fame of the mark. The Trade Marks Act, 1999, § 11(6)(v).
178 Brian J. Winterfeldt & Laura S. Emmett, Protecting Famous Marks, INT’L TRADEMARK
ASS’N BULL., Oct. 1, 2001, at 2, https://www.inta.org/wp-content/uploads/member-only/about/
inta-news/inta-bulletin/INTABulletinVol56no18.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ERD-RXNE].
179 That said, the Registrar is required to take into consideration Sections 11(6) to 11(9)
of
the Trade Marks Act, discussed above. The Trade Marks Act § 11(6)–(9). It is also arguable that
the right of third parties to object and the right to appeal act as limitations on the power of the
Registrar. Presumably, there may be marks that may qualify as well-known under Section 11(6)
of the statute but have either not made it to the well-known marks list because adequate
documentation was not presented, or because the Registrar did not think that they would qualify
despite the documentation. The status of these marks may have to be judicially determined.
180 Milmet Oftho Indus. & Ors. v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
181 Id.
182 Id.
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reputation sufficient to trump over a local prior user.183 It would have
been nice to see the court delve into the question of whether the
“relevant market” was the general public, the patients/consumers, the
doctors, the smaller percentage of doctors who travel abroad, or the
pharmacists who dispense these medications. This case succinctly
presented the conflict between the spill-over reputation of well-known
marks and territoriality underpinnings, which the Indian Supreme
Court failed to capture.
The Supreme Court of India indicated that multinational
corporations, which have no intention of coming to India or
introducing their product in India, should not be allowed to throttle an
Indian company by not permitting it to sell a product in India if the
Indian company has genuinely adopted the mark and developed the
product and is first in the market. Thus, the ultimate test, according to
the court, should be who is first in the market.184
For the first time, the court indicated that priority of innocent use
within India should perhaps supersede transborder reputation. The
court also outlined that otherwise, it unfairly subjects local users to
foreign corporations and their brand investments.185 The Ocuflox
decision was important to raise the issue of a prior good faith user
within India versus a prior foreign user of a famous mark. Yet, courts
continued to favor global fame. In 2006, a single judge of the Delhi High
Court considered whether the mark “Blenders Pride,” used on whisky
manufactured by the plaintiff, enjoyed a transborder reputation.186
Adopted in 1973, the foreign plaintiff had been selling the said whisky
in over fifty countries worldwide.187 The plaintiff asserted that “Blenders
Pride” had a transborder reputation in India by showing that, between
1980 and 1990, over one million people had traveled to India and would
have been exposed to the whisky.188 The plaintiff’s business was first set
up in India in 1993. Ironically, however, in 2003, the respective marks
of the plaintiff and the defendant, namely, “Blenders Pride,” were
advertised in the same Trademark Journal, and both parties filed
oppositions against each other’s application.189 The defendants claimed
Id.
Id.
185 Id.
186 Austin Nichols & Co. v. Arvind Behl, (2006) 32 PTC 133, ¶ 2 (India).
187 Id. ¶ 24.
188 Id.
189 Id. ¶ 29. The Indian Trade Marks Office granted registration to the defendants in 2004. Id.
In 2005, the plaintiffs learned that the defendants had introduced their whisky to the Indian
market, and a suit was filed. Id. The defendants asserted that they were the prior users of the
“Blenders Pride” mark in India, thus bringing into question prior users within the jurisdiction
versus reputation outside the territory. Id. ¶ 30.
183
184
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that they were the prior users within India and, hence, introduced the
question of the primacy between a well-known foreign mark and the
territoriality principle.190
This was perhaps the first decision, although the court does not
mention it, where the issue of prior users within the jurisdiction versus
reputation outside the territory became significant.191 The court focused
on the plaintiff’s global reputation since 1973 but refused to consider
the plaintiff’s disinterest in the market until 1995.192 Unfortunately, the
courts have placed much emphasis on advertisements and refused to
consider the intersections of a good faith prior territorial user over
transborder reputation.
For example, in 2008, in Kiran Jogani & Anr. v. George V. Records,
SARL, the Delhi High Court dealt with the rights over the name
“BUDDHA-BAR.”193 The defendant first used it in India in 2002. But
the plaintiff asserted that he used the mark as part of a music album,
and he was the first to use the name in 1996 for a restaurant in Paris.194
The proof of use of the name for a restaurant was not overwhelming.
The court was enamored that the plaintiff had registered the mark in
the European community, the United States, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, France, and Hong Kong, but the court never questioned the
lapse in seeking timely registration in India. The court relied solely on
the “coverage given to the restaurant and the music in international
press and the magazines including transmission of programs through
television channels” as establishing transborder reputation.195 Based on
this, the court upheld transborder reputation in the mark “BUDDHABAR.”196
Similarly, in 2013, a case relating to the rights over the trademark
“MUCOSOLVAN” for use on cough syrup was heard before a single
Id. ¶ 38.
Id. ¶ 38.
192 Id. ¶¶ 41, 44, 47.
193 Kiran Jogani & Anr. v. George V. Records, SARL, (2008) 155 DLT 739 (India).
194 Id. at 741. Further, the plaintiff asserted that the music albums played at said restaurant by
well-known disc jockeys were compiled into CDs as they became extremely popular and were
then sold under the trademark BUDDHA-BAR from the year 1999 onwards. Id. The plaintiff also
claimed extensive worldwide registrations for said mark in Classes Nine and Forty-One and
argued that its reputation had spread across the world and spilled over into India well prior to
the adoption of the offending mark by the appellants-defendants in 2002 in regard to musical
records. Id. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed to establish user rights in India
and that the first invoice on record was dated February 21, 2002, which was after the release of
the ‘defendants’ album in January 2002. Id. at 742. In doing so, this court considered, “what
would be the best material which the respondent-plaintiff could have produced to establish its
trans-border reputation?” Id. at 745.
195 Id. at 745 (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 748.
190
191
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judge of the Delhi High Court.197 A German company established in
1885
asserted
transborder
reputation
over
the
mark
“MUCOSOLVAN,” which it claimed to have adopted in 1975 and used
continuously—outside of India—since 1979.198 The plaintiff’s assertions
were based on being the first to adopt and use the mark on cough syrup
globally.199 At the time of the suit, the plaintiff had registered the
trademark in ninety-three countries, the trademark was present in the
market in over fifty-six countries, and “MUCOSOLVAN” products had
documented sales of over six billion Euros. And yet, the company
applied for a registration in India only after the defendant started using
it.200 Even then, the pending trademark application was on a “proposed
to be used basis.”201 Further, the plaintiff had not used its trademark
“MUCOSOLVAN” in India until the date of the suit.
The court merely considered the plaintiff’s global sales and seemed
awed by the plaintiff’s registration over the mark “MUCOSOLVAN” in
ninety-three countries but ignored the fact that the plaintiff did not care
for the Indian market to use or register the mark.202
Other cases include a 2016 Division Bench decision of the Delhi
High Court, which decided the issue of the transborder reputation of
the mark “LAVERA.”203 The term Lavera is a Latin word meaning “the
truth.”204 The plaintiff, a German company, had adopted the mark
“LAVERA” in 1980 for cosmetic products and marketed these products
since 1982.205 The plaintiff held registrations extensively around Europe
but had a pending registration in India at the time of filing the suit.206
But the plaintiff had never used the mark in India. Defendants used the
mark in India from 2005 and applied for registration in India. 207 The
defendants claimed that they adopted the identical mark “LAVERA”
from the aloe vera plant used in beauty treatments.208 The single judge

197 Boehringer Ingelheim Pharma GMBH & Co. KG v. Premchand Godha & Anr., AIR 2014
Del 916 (India).
198 Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
199 Id. ¶ 4.
200 Id. ¶¶ 3–5, 15.
201 Id. ¶ 15.
202 Id. ¶¶ 4, 15.
203 MAC Personal Care Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Laverana GMBH & Co. KG & Anr., (2016) 65 PTC
357 (India).
204 Id. ¶ 2.
205 Id.
206 Id. It was the respondent’s claim that, due to such extensive worldwide use, its products
sold under the same mark have earned goodwill and reputation, its products are freely available
on eBay and online stores, and it has domain name registrations in various countries. Id.
207 Id. ¶ 3.
208 Id.
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held in favor of the plaintiff by noting that the existence of a website
originating abroad was sufficient to show the transborder reputation,
even if it had no activity in India at the relevant time.209
In the Lavera decision, the court focused on the growth of Internet
and modern means of communication and how it made it easier to
establish international reputation and its spill-over effects.210 Given that
digital divide is a pervasive issue in India that leaves a large section of
the population with no or limited access to digital technology, the focus
on a website seems a little misplaced. In all, the “OCUFLUX” decision
and the cases that followed blindly allowed foreign marks to be
registered without establishing a proper basis for defining fame, use,
and abandonment, which precipitated a huge change in India.211 This is
discussed in the following portions of this Article.
While the OCUFLUX decision was arguably deficient for not
delving into the legal question more fully, it successfully presented the
conflict between the spill-over reputation of well-known marks and
their territoriality underpinnings.212 In 2010, the Delhi High Court
addressed the legal question presented in the OCUFLUX decision in a
case involving Century 21, a real estate company from the United
States.213 The defendant, an Indian company, used the same name as
part of its corporate name and was in the real estate brokerage services
business. Century 21 from the United States presented evidence to
prove its worldwide reputation from advertisements and awards in
several countries but was unable to prove interest or presence in
India.214 For the first time, Justice Dhingra focused on the plaintiff’s
efforts, or the lack thereof, during the time it established worldwide
reputation.215 The court noted that the plaintiff’s webpage did not list
India as a country where its services are available.216 Most importantly,
the court held that mere registration cannot amount to use of the mark
in India and that local use is required to prove transborder reputation.217
Perhaps the United States’ judicial decisions discussed below had an
influence in precipitating a change balancing the use and territoriality
factors with the fame factor.
Id. ¶ 7.
Id. ¶ 16.
211 Mukul Baveja, India: Trans-Border Reputation: Protection of Foreign Trade Marks in India,
MONDAQ (Nov. 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/3bbe0ky [https://perma.cc/9MUG-NM5C].
212 Milmet Oftho Indus. & Ors. v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624 (India).
213 Century 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century 21 Main Realty Pvt. Ltd., (2010) I.A. 10426/2007
(India).
214 Id. ¶ 5.
215 Id. ¶¶ 3–5.
216 Id. ¶ 3.
217 Id. ¶ 5.
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IV. UNITED STATES AND WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARKS
The following Part outlines how the United States treats wellknown marks by emphasizing use. The discussion compares American
judgments with those from India to analyze the rights of a well-known
mark registered in the United States by a local user who thereby
becomes a prior-registered-user within the United States. This Part also
examines whether fame of the mark abroad is an exception to use and
territoriality in the United States.
A.

Fame Intersects with Priority and Territoriality

At the outset, it is important to lay out the dichotomy that exists in
the United States between well-known marks and famous marks.
Within the United States, the Federal Trademarks Dilution Act defines
and provides a set of criteria to determine the fame of a mark within a
territory.218 The objective is to ensure that when a mark attains the
distinction of being famous the mark is not used on products that
impair the distinctiveness, even if it is not a competing, identical, or
related good. Thus, unlike infringement, which prevents consumer
confusion due to third-party use of a mark, dilution prevents
impairment of the distinctiveness of a famous mark.219 Dilution does
not deal with well-known marks from abroad. Instead, it prevents
impairment of marks that are famous within the United States.
In the United States, protecting well-known marks from abroad
runs counter to the strong use requirements. Thus, to conform to
international trade agreements, well-known marks from abroad should
218 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). Under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, also known
as the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA):

[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.
In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court
may consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark,
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered
under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id. (emphasis added).
219 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
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form an exception to the territoriality doctrine. This exception is
typically termed as the famous marks doctrine.220 Under the famous
marks doctrine, the question is whether a second user adopted the mark
in good faith in a different territory.
The famous marks doctrine was first recognized in the United
States in Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Restaurant & Cafe.221 The name
“Prunier” was used for restaurants in Paris and London.222 When a third
party opened a new restaurant in New York City with a similar name,
the owner sought to enjoin the defendant’s use of the name even though
they did not have operations in New York.223 The appeals court, which
sustained the ruling of the trial court, highlighted the general rule of
territoriality.224 Between two users of the same mark, the first territorial
user has priority over the mark. However, if bad faith use of a famous
name by a second user is proven, it is an exception to the territoriality
rule.225 Fame of the foreign mark within the United States territory as
opposed to worldwide fame, which is the standard used in India, is a
relevant factor in deciding whether the second user adopted the mark
in good faith.226 Additionally, using unfair competition principles, a
foreign mark may be entitled to protection in the United States even if
it was neither used nor registered—provided it is well-known among
consumers and there is clear proof of lack of bad faith appropriation of
the mark.227 This rule is similar to what India seems to have adopted.
While some of these decisions were based on state common law rather
than the Lanham Act, many of the underlying principles remain
applicable.228
B.

Local Use and Fame Abroad—Traveling Americans Need Not
Know of All Marks Abroad

The following discussion compares how courts in the United States
have dealt with cases in situations where a mark: a) is well-known in a
foreign country; and b) has been subject to prior registration by a third
220 See also MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at § 29:4 (asserting that the famous marks doctrine is
incorporated into United States domestic law through Lanham Act Sections 43(a), 44(b), and
44(h)).
221 See Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, 288 N.Y.S. 529, 536–38 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
222 Id. at 530–31.
223 Id. at 531.
224 Id. at 535–36.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 537.
227 Zobel, supra note 47, at 148–49.
228 Id. at 149 (discussing cases establishing trademark law).
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party within the United States. Importantly, these cases highlight the
role of priority of use and how that helps to secure trademark rights
within the United States purely based on first territorial use of the mark.
In 1981, Larry Christman, a United States citizen, visited a Person’s
Corporation retail store in Japan.229 The Person’s name was adopted in
1977 by Takaya Iwasaki to market and distribute clothing items in retail
stores located in Japan.230 Upon return from Japan, Christman
developed designs for his own Person’s brand sportswear line based on
the Person’s products he had purchased in Japan.231 By April 1983,
Christman not only supplied clothes bearing the Person’s logo in the
United States, but he also registered the name for use on wearing
apparel.232 Meanwhile, Person’s became a well-known and highly
respected brand in the Japanese fashion industry. Soon the Japanese
company vied to enter the United States market and wanted to open its
stores in the United States. When they initiated an action to cancel
Christman’s registration, a suit followed.233 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision that Christman was a “good faith”
prior user of the mark in the United States. Arguably, there was
sufficient evidence on record indicating that the defendant
misappropriated a mark which was being used in a foreign country.234
The Federal Circuit adopted the view that copying a mark in use in a
foreign country is not per se evidence of bad faith unless the foreign
mark is famous in the United States at that time the copying is
undertaken and the mark is copied for the purpose of interfering with
the prior user’s planned expansion into the United States.235 The Federal
Circuit noted that “Christman’s conduct in appropriating and using
appellant’s mark in a market where he believed the Japanese
manufacturer did not compete can hardly be considered unscrupulous
commercial conduct.”236
Thus, the jurisprudence in the United States is that territorial use
is the critical component to establish priority over a mark. Even if the
mark is otherwise famous abroad, territorial use within the country is
more important to establish priority. Thus, the territoriality doctrine,
especially the way it is defined and applied in the United States, does
not deter third parties from adopting, using, and protecting, within the
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236

Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1566–67.
Id. at 1567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1570.
Id. at 1568–70.
Id. at 1570.
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United States, trademarks that may be known and protected in another
country. It also protects Americans who in good faith may be
unknowingly using a mark that is similar to or the same as a foreign
mark.
Unlike the Indian courts, which attribute traveling Indians with
exceptional awareness of obscure foreign trademarks and punish them
even if they are first users of the mark within the territory, the United
States seems to tend towards the belief that traveling Americans need
not know of marks in several countries. Hence, from a national
perspective, the United States’ perspective seems like a fair
determination—although it does amount to condoning the stealing of
relatively good marks from other countries under limited
circumstances.
C.

Fame Without Use

The narrative below examines a situation where a foreign mark
enjoys a reputation in the United States where it is not being used. If a
local user appropriates the mark, the question is whether courts will
focus on the reputation of the foreign mark or on the use of the mark
to determine priority.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision involving a well-known Mexican
grocery chain—Grupo Gigante—dealt with this question. The Mexican
chain has been operational in Mexico since 1962 but did not have a
presence in the United States.237 In 1996, Michael Dallo appropriated
the name to open an American chain of grocery stores in a locality
where shoppers were familiar with the Mexican mark.238 Importantly,
the mark was not federally registered by either party.239 The Mexican
mark was well-known in the United States and, hence, it raised the
question of whether the Mexican owner should be entitled to priority
within the United States based on the fame the mark acquired from its
use in Mexico.
Grupo Gigante, the plaintiff, asserted that the fame of its mark in
Mexico and the knowledge of its mark among Mexican consumers in
the California market should result in priority in the United States.240
The defendants argued that the territoriality principle required that the
mark be used within the United States. Thus, Dallo, as the prior United
States user, was entitled to protection, even though he had essentially
237
238
239
240

Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 1092.
Id.
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adopted the mark in the United States with full knowledge of its fame
in Mexico.241
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the famous marks doctrine
existed and went on to determine how it juxtaposed the territoriality
doctrine.242 That is, Section 44 of the Lanham Act implements Article
10bis of the Paris Convention,243 which requires member countries “to
assure to nationals of [other member] countries effective protection
against unfair competition.”244 Further, Section 44 of the Lanham Act
extended protections to foreign nationals, although only “to the extent
necessary to satisfy the United States’ treaty obligations.”245
The district court agreed that Grupo established that its mark and
its store were known (secondary reputation) to residents of the San
Diego area.246 Yet, the court held that the presence of secondary
meaning alone was insufficient to establish fame of the foreign mark
such that it can overcome the need for territorial use. In addition to
secondary meaning, the Ninth Circuit required that district courts must
be satisfied by a “preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial
percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is familiar
with the foreign mark.”247 The court defined the term “relevant
American market” as the geographic area “where the defendant uses the
alleged infringing mark.”248
Basically, not just the Mexican immigrants but all Americans in the
area would be aware of the mark. This definition is slightly skewed
because the store specifically targeted Mexican immigrants as its
customers. To determine the relevant American market, the court
stated that factors such as whether the defendant had intentionally
copied the mark and “whether customers of the American firm [were]
likely to think they [had] patronize[ed]” the foreign trademark owner,
should be considered.249 The court held that these factors may not
necessarily be determinative, although they are relevant to show
consumer confusion or fraud, “which are the reasons for having a
famous-mark exception.”250 Despite the fame of the Grupo Gigante
See id.
Id. at 1094; see also Fuji Photo Film Co., v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d
591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally Zobel, supra note 47, at 146 (discussing the circuit
confusion on this area of law).
243 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1099; see also Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 10bis.
244 Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 10bis.
245 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1099.
246 Id. at 1096.
247 Id. at 1098.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
241
242
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mark in Mexico, it could not use its reputation and fame to get
protection in the United States because the mark was not used or
registered in the United States.
Thus, a mark famous in a foreign country cannot use its reputation
and fame to get protection in the United States if the mark is not used
or registered in the United States. This is especially difficult for marks
that may be well-known within large pockets of different immigrant
communities but not generally well-known. The decision directs
foreign mark owners interested in the United States market to carry the
burden of registering the mark in the United States. This decision is
generally unfriendly to marks famous in one jurisdiction and thus,
enjoys a reputation and identity in another foreign country.
This decision is unlike in India where, in its zeal to recognize
foreign marks, courts have repeatedly narrowed the goodwill
requirement to what is recognized by the “travelling Indians” and to
Internet savvy Indians, which is a small class of the population of the
country. Thus, a case with a similar fact pattern in India would have
considered the number of Americans travelling to Mexico and awarded
the case to the first global (Mexican) as opposed to the local user.
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed that well-known foreign marks
can gain exclusive rights even in territories where they are not in use, it
struggled with defining how much fame or how well-known the foreign
mark must be in the United States to get protection.251 The famous
marks doctrine has always had a tumultuous recognition in the United
States. The discussion in the initial part of this Article of the 1959
decision in Vaudable from the state court of New York is a case to this
point.252
As a rule, the United States has struggled to dissociate use as a
prerequisite to grant priority to well-known marks with fame if they are
not used in the country. In Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, the court held that the “United States
courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce trademark rights that
exist only under foreign law.”253 Similarly, in Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El
Gallo Meat Market, Inc., the court noted that it was up to Congress to
prescribe the bases for federal trademark claims for well-known marks
and barring that, the famous marks doctrine had no place in the United
States federal law/Lanham Act for well-known marks.254 In Empresa
Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., the court opined that federal
Id.
See generally Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
253 Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 628 (4th
Cir. 2003).
254 Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
251
252
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trademark law embodies principles of famous marks doctrine under
Section 43(a).255 Nevertheless, use remained fundamental to the federal
Lanham Act. This court also noted that recognition of the famous
foreign marks exception without use would be justified only after
adequate congressional action in light of an embargo that prevailed
then.256 In gist, the tendency by the United States courts is to provide
rights to the local user who uses the mark first within the United
States—this is even more so if the United States user has managed to
register the foreign mark first in the United States.
D.

Foreigners & Protection for Well-Known Marks Used in United
States

Part III demonstrated the significant recognition India has
awarded foreign trademarks, of which United States trademark owners
have been the biggest beneficiaries. It is worth recalling that India
specifically derogated from the priority doctrine to bestow recognition
for foreign trademarks in several cases awarding rights to foreign
trademark owners who had abandoned or not used the mark
appropriately. The following discusses how the United States treats a
trademark that is used in the United States and is well-known both in
India and worldwide. The case in question, ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini,257
related to the acquisition of the name Bukhara—that was
internationally used, known, and voted one of the world’s fifty best
restaurants by a London-based restaurant magazine.258 The plaintiff,
ITC Limited (ITC), an Indian corporation, operated the world-famous
Bukhara restaurant since 1977 in different parts of the world.259 In 1987,
ITC obtained a federal United States trademark registration for
Bukhara for restaurant services but the New York restaurant closed on
December 17, 1991, and on August 28, 1997, ITC cancelled its Chicago
franchise.260 In 1999, the defendants, who had worked in one of the
Bukhara restaurants, opened a restaurant in New York called the

255 See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 2005); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125.
256 Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco, 399 F.3d at 472 (“Embargo Regulations bar Cubatabaco’s
acquisition of the U.S. COHIBA mark through the famous marks doctrine.”); see also ITC Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that Congress has not yet
incorporated that doctrine into federal trademark law.”).
257 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d 135.
258 Id. at 143 n.4.
259 Id. at 143.
260 Id.
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Bukhara Grill.261 The defendants’ restaurant mimicked the logos, decor,
staff uniforms, wood-slab menus, and red-checkered customer bibs of
the plaintiff’s restaurants.262 ITC sued the defendants in federal court in
New York claiming that defendants’ use of a similar mark for a
restaurant in New York constituted trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and false advertising in violation of federal and state law.263
In 2007, the Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that ITC depended on
the “famous marks” doctrine.264 The court found that this doctrine was
not recognized under the current federal trademark law.265 In
determining whether unfair competition principles apply, the court
held that ITC “confront[ed] a high hurdle in demonstrating that, at the
time of defendants’ challenged actions, it possessed a priority right to
the use of the Bukhara mark and related trade dress for restaurants in
the United States.”266 Further, the court held that “a foreign mark holder
generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even if a
United States competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for his
own use.”267 Thus, because ITC had ceased using the mark within the
United States, the court considered the mark abandoned (nonuse)
within the United States.268 Abandonment was cited against ITC’s
ability to establish priority.269 The Second Circuit, citing Grupo Gigante,
emphasized the role of use (territoriality) and limited the protection
extended to foreign mark holders to rights specified in Section 44(b).270
In refusing to recognize the famous marks doctrine, the court held:
“[A]bsent some use of its mark in the United States, a foreign mark
holder generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even
if a United States competitor has knowingly appropriated that mark for
his own use.”271
In all, the court opined that foreign trademark holders must have
registered the mark and used it within the United States to be entitled

Id. at 144.
Id.
263 Id. at 145.
264 Id. at 142 (“[W]e affirm the award of summary judgment on ITC’s infringement
claim . . . and federal unfair competition claim.”).
265 Id. at 153, 164.
266 Id. at 154.
267 Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
268 Id. at 172; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1989);
MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at § 17:1 (defining “abandonment”).
269 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 146–47.
270 See id. at 155–56. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1126.
271 ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 156 (emphasis added).
261
262
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to similar protections.272 Basically, the court outlined that although the
famous marks doctrine was recognized in the United States, Section
44(b) granted foreign mark holders “only those protections of United
States law already specified in the Lanham Act.”273 These are protections
that were based on prior use or registration of the mark within the
United States. The court specifically held that the Lanham Act’s unfair
competition protections are cabined by the long-established principle
of use or territoriality.274
In effect, just like in the Christman decision and the Grupo Gigante
decision, the Second Circuit too allowed a defendant to knowingly
misappropriate a mark that is internationally famous on the ground
that the United States merely recognized a limited form of the famous
marks doctrine exception to the use requirement of the territoriality
doctrine.275
Perhaps, had the circuit courts considered doctrines such as
reciprocity, or even the “universality principle,” they would not have
struggled with the need to quantify fame.276 Under the principle of
reciprocity, other countries will provide the same treatment that the
United States provides to foreigners in this country.277 For example, a
mark that is famous in the United States, such as Victoria’s Secret, is
likely to enjoy fame in foreign countries where it is not registered and
enjoys a limited reputation within a smaller segment of the society.
Under the circumstances, if the United States wants a foreign country
to recognize the fame of a United States mark, American courts must
extend the same courtesy to foreign marks. Similarly, under the
doctrine of universality, if a trademark is lawfully used in one country
and considered well-known in that country, that mark would be
considered lawfully used over the same goods or services in the rest of
the world and could not be deemed infringing in another country.
The most skewed aspect of the judgment is that if it was translated
in the context of other jurisdictions, this ruling would imply that even
if Starbucks or McDonald’s is knowingly appropriated for the first time,
in say, Timbuktu, if it were not used or registered there, these

Id. at 164.
Id. at 163.
274 Id. at 164.
275 Id. at 172.
276 See Prutzman, supra note 53, at 107; see also Faris, supra note 48, at 456; Am. Cir. Breaker
Corp. v. Or. Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 2005).
277 See Parisi & Ghei, supra note 42, at 94.
272
273
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companies cannot expect to have their trademark recognized as long as
Timbuktu established high standards of territoriality.278
Also, the decision from the United States does not logically sit well
within the framework of the functions of the USTR,279 which as part of
its charge to develop and coordinate U.S. international trade, compiles
the Special 301 Report280 against perceived unfair trade practices
perpetrated by foreign countries. Considering the role of the USTR, the
next Part examines why the United States, of all countries, needs to
recognize famous trademarks to avoid looking hypocritical.281
V. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE WHAT IT ADVOCATES?
The narrative above recognizes that the United States and India,
our major examples, have taken completely opposite positions on the
question of recognition of well-known marks, wherein the United States
has a focus on use to gain priority within the country. With that
background, this Part demonstrates how the United States’ national
posture is inconsistent with its international posture on the question.
Thus, this Part discusses how the United States posture is
inapposite to the role and function of the Office of the USTR,282 which
as part of its charge to develop and coordinate United States
international trade, compiles the Special 301 Report against perceived
unfair trade practices perpetrated by foreign countries.283
A.

United States Lacking a Position on Well-Known Marks

At its best, the United States’ position on protection of famous
foreign trademarks is confusing with respect to the implementation of
Section 44 of the Lanham Act, which creates substantive law or a right
of action applicable to international trademark disputes based on the

278 See Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco,
329 F.3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003). But there have been other cases in the United States concluding
that U.S. trademark rights can be acquired merely through advertising in the United States
combined with rendering of services abroad to American customers.
279 See Mission of the USTR, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/
about-us/about-ustr [https://perma.cc/G7VQ-VR9Z].
280 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (granting the authority to unilaterally exert subtle trade
pressures).
281 See Cook, supra note 102, at 418 (“Consequently, the United States is open to criticism for
failing to fully meet its treaty obligations while demanding compliance by other cosignatories.”).
282 See Mission of the USTR, supra note 279.
283 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2).
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trade obligations under the Paris Convention and the TRIPS
Agreement.284 Section 44 of the Lanham Act alludes to such treatment
in that it states that foreign nationals are protected to the extent
necessary to satisfy the United States’ treaty obligations:
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or
treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the
repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is also a
party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States
by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the
conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to
any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in
addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise
entitled by this chapter.285

Operationally, the United States does not extend reciprocal
treatment to nationals of its trade partners. That is, courts in the United
States have not dealt adequately with the reciprocity issue under Section
44 of the Lanham Act. Unfortunately, courts in the United States have
held a narrow view of Section 44 of the Lanham Act in light of Article
10bis of the Paris Convention. Article 10bis essentially provides that
member countries are bound to assure each other’s nationals effective
protection against unfair competition.286 The courts in the United States
have essentially read the requirement of national treatment as merely
requiring equal treatment of foreign and domestic parties only in
trademark disputes.287 National treatment has more breadth than
simply providing “equal treatment in a trademark dispute.”288 Such a
reading represents a narrow view of the national treatment doctrine.
This narrow view has resulted in the United States repeatedly noting
that famous marks are entitled to protection against unfair competition,
but they are not entitled to protection under federal law.289 Thus, the
284 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that
the Paris Convention does not create a right of action separate and distinct from those available
under the Lanham Act); see also Zobel, supra note 47, at 165, 171 (asserting that the state of the
famous marks doctrine within federal trademark law is currently unsettled).
285 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b).
286 Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 10bis.
287 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Recs., 296 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002).
288 Int’l Cafe v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
Paris Convention “only requires ‘national treatment’”).
289 Id.; see also Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“[A party] has no claim to a nonexistent federal cause of action for unfair competition. . . . [T]he
Paris Convention provides for national treatment, and does not define the substantive law of
unfair competition. . . . Because the Paris Convention creates neither a federal cause of action nor
additional substantive rights, the district court properly dismissed Gigante’s Paris Convention
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trademark protection extended to foreigners derogates from the
national treatment requirement, which necessitates that foreigners get
the exact same treatment as nationals.
Interestingly, in Emmpresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,290
the district court concluded that the rights identified in Article 6bis of
the Paris Convention could be pursued under Section 44(b) and 44(h)
of the Lanham Act, outlined above. Article 6bis outlines basic
protections for well-known trademarks.291 Section 44(h) of the Lanham
Act states that “[a]ny person designated in subsection (b) of this section
as entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter”
shall also be entitled to protection against unfair competition as well as
the remedies provided for infringement of marks as appropriate against
acts of unfair competition.292
This subection arguably provides an additional, as opposed to an
alternative, layer of protection in the form of unfair competition rights
to foreigners, especially to those from countries that extend reciprocal
recognition of well-known or famous American trademarks. That is, the
international obligation of the United States outlined in Lanham Act
Section 44(b) and Section 44(h) can be read as requiring the United
States to reciprocally recognize famous foreign trademarks of other
countries by making appropriate exceptions to the territoriality
doctrine. Thus, use within the United States should not be a
precondition to recognize foreign trademarks that are well-known and
have acquired sufficient fame within the United States. There is little
support to read the Lanham Act’s protections as being limited to only
unfair competition or that they do not extend to creating an exception
to the principle of territoriality.293 This position finds support from
other leading academics, such as McCarthy who has concluded that
“both the TRIP[S] Agreement and the Paris Convention Article 6bis
require the United States to recognize rights” in famous foreign marks,
even if they have not been registered or used in the United States.294

claims.” (citations omitted)); De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc.,
440 F. Supp. 2d 249, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (supporting well-known mark claim under Section
43(a)).
290 Emmpresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 247, 283–84 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); see also DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 57, at 440.
291 Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 6bis.
292 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h).
293 See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 485 (2005).
294 MCCARTHY, supra note 49, at § 29:62; see also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135,
163 (2d Cir. 2007).
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United States Treats Emphasis on the Use Doctrine by Trade
Partners as “Trade Derogation”

The United States’ line of thinking does not comport with what the
United States expects when its well-known marks are adopted by thirdparty prior users in other countries. Indeed, the USTR, which oversees
whether other countries are abiding by their trade obligations, expects
other nations to protect well-known American trademarks in foreign
countries even if the famous mark is not used in that country.295
As part of its role as the dispenser of trade policy expertise on
trade-related intellectual property protection issues, typically in an
unsolicited and unilateral manner, the USTR relies on inputs from
private industries.296 Operationally, the USTR regularly decries that
other countries do not extend appropriate intellectual property rights—
even when they employ a similar line or a jurisprudentially sound line
of reasoning. This is true not just in trademarks but also in other areas
of intellectual property rights.297
The following table outlines, from the year 2000 until 2018,
citations in the Special 301 Report of the United States Trade
Representative on the basis of lack of recognition of famous American
marks by other trading partners.298 These reports, issued on a yearly
basis, call out countries that the United States unilaterally terms as
violators of international intellectual obligations. The table below
captures the countries the USTR condemns as inadequately protecting
well-known American trademarks.

295 See Interagency Center on Trade Implementation, Monitoring, and Enforcement (ICTIME),
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/itec
[https://perma.cc/2FVE-H459].
296 See Mission of the USTR, supra note 279.
297 See generally Letter from Srividhya Ragavan, Brook Baker & Sean Flynn, to U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n (Feb. 7, 2014), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ragavan-bakerflynn02072014.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7GX-HLQZ].
298 See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 5 (2018).
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Countries Cited

Notes

1.

Year of
Special
301
Report
2000299

Russia, Dominican
Republic, and Spain

2.

2001301

Russia and Jamaica

3.

2002303

China, Russia, and
Jamaica304

4.

2003306

China and Mexico

With reference to Spain, the report
states “recent court decisions have
called into question the adequacy
of protection for well-known
trademarks.”300
Russia, Lithuania, and Hong Kong
complied with the international
requirement for recognizing wellknown marks, although it is
unclear whether any of these
countries retained the use
requirement.302
Vietnam received an honorable
mention because it extended
“indefinite protection to wellknown or famous marks.”305
China was cited because “we are
concerned that foreign trademark
owners do not appear to be
receiving national treatment with
regard to their well-known marks.
China has recognized nearly 200
marks as ‘well-known,’ none of
which is a foreign mark.”307

299 See Press Release, Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Releases Super 301, Special
301 And Title VII Reports (May 1, 2000), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
2000%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/73VZ-7LUG].
300 Id. at 28.
301 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2001).
302 Id. at 33–36. “‘Rules for Recognizing a Trademark as a Well-Known Trademark in the
Russian Federation’ ‘was registered with its Ministry of Justice.’” Id. at 33. “On June 16, Hong
Kong published proposed amendments to its Trademarks Ordinance.” Id. “Lithuania’s new Law
on Trade and Service Marks took effect on January 1 . . . .” Id. at 36.
303 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2002).
304 Id. at 17 (“[T]he United States has concerns over China’s lack of protection of foreign wellknown marks in a manner that is consistent with international standards.”).
305 Id. at 35.
306 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2003).
307 Id. at 11.
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5.

2004308

China, Paraguay,
Brazil, Egypt, and
India

6.

2005311

China

7.

2006313

8.

2010314

Brazil and Russia (and
some of this was for
counterfeit products)
China, Chile, India,
and Venezuela

9.

2015316

493

China received an honorable
mention because: i) “China’s State
Administration of Industry and
Commerce issued the Rules on the
Determination and Protection of
Well-Known Trademarks,”309 and
ii) in 2004, China recognized
United States companies’ wellknown trademarks.310
China was cited for inadequately
implementing protection for wellknown trademarks.312

Belarus received an honorable
mention because “[p]ositive steps
in 2009 included Belarus’ adoption
of amendments to its trademark
law, including amendments to
provide greater protection for wellknown trademarks.”315

The USTR lamented
that “in a number of
countries,
governments often do
not provide the full
range of
internationally-

See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2004).
Id. at 35.
310 The Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-known Marks (PDPWM)
were announced by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce in 2003 and mentioned
in the Special 301 Report of 2004. See About Us, TRADEMARK OFF. OF THE STATE ADMIN. FOR
INDUS. & COM. OF CHINA, http://sbj.cnipa.gov.cn/sbjEnglish [https://perma.cc/5R6U-47LD]; Xia
Yu, China and Well-Known Trademark Protection, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/
china-and-well-known-trademark-protection-24264 (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); OFF. OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2004).
311 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2005).
312 See id. China was a subject of out-of-cycle review this year. Id.
313 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2006).
314 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2010).
315 Id. at 28.
316 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2015 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2015).
308
309
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10.

2016318

11.

2017320
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recognized trademark
protections. . . . Robust
protection for wellknown marks is also
important for many
U.S. producers and
traders who have built
up the reputation of
their brands.”317
Report laments
“unreasonably high
standards for
establishing ‘wellknown’ mark status”
in China.319
Report notes “third
parties are able to
obtain trademarks in
China even when the
U.S. trademark is
famous or well-known
and the resulting
registrations damage
the goodwill or
interests of U.S. right
holders.”321

To the extent that the United States hesitates to recognize wellknown foreign marks to the detriment of foreign trademark holders, it
acts inapposite to what the office of the USTR preaches to other
countries. The United States’ position does not comport to the WIPO
Joint Recommendation in Article 2(3)(i), which specifically prohibits
member States from embracing the use requirement to deny protection
for a well-known foreign mark.322 Moreover, bilateral agreements of the
United States with other nations have included compliance with
recognition of well-known marks and WIPO Recommendations.323
317
318
319
320
321
322
323

Id. at 16.
See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2016).
Id. at 18.
See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2017).
Id. at 31.
World Intell. Prop. Org., supra note 95, art. 2(3)(i).
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Importantly, by not recognizing well-known marks, American
courts condone actions of Americans that they would condemn if
perpetrated by foreigners or other countries as “unfair trade practice.”
In essence, the effect of the decisions to not recognize well-known
foreign trademarks, while insisting other countries do so, leads to one
undesirable conclusion. It condones behavior of Americans who
misappropriate and use famous foreign marks, provided they register
the marks within the United States and use them. But, if the same
scenario occurs abroad, then the USTR terms it as “unfair trade.” It also
goes against the basic ideological and principled basis that the United
States uses to tout trademark law as a means to preserve market
integrity.324
C.

Reciprocity and United States Trademark Holders

Most importantly, United States trademark owners will suffer
when other countries take note of the United States’ position and refuse
to recognize famous American trademarks abroad.
In the ITC decision discussed earlier, even though a well-known
mark was knowingly misappropriated and used by a local user, the
Second Circuit emphasized the use requirement and further opined that
ITC depended on the “famous marks” doctrine, which the court found
was not fully recognized under current federal trademark law.325 This
decision was widely circulated in India.326 Perhaps this decision was an
influencer, perhaps not. Either way, the Indian Supreme Court, when it
had the first chance, focused on use to challenge the long-established
precedent of recognizing a well-known trademark.
In 2017, the Supreme Court of India considered a trademark
passing-off action initiated by Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha
(Toyota) for the Prius mark, which it has been using extensively for its
first commercial hybrid car.327 The court held that Toyota had not
established goodwill or reputation for its mark in India as of 2001, when
the defendant first started locally using the mark.328 Although from 1997
Toyota had launched the Prius in different global markets, the car was

See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 103, at 21.
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 159 (2d Cir. 2007).
326 See, e.g., Dhananjay Mahapatra, ITC Loses Bhukara Copyright Case in US, TIMES OF INDIA
(Aug. 3, 2007), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/ITC-losesBukhara-copyright-case-in-US/articleshow/2251999.cms [https://perma.cc/L6W3-8NW2].
327 Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. M/S Prius Auto Indus. Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1, ¶ 2
(India).
328 Id. ¶ 14.
324
325
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first launched in India only in 2010.329 Until 2009, Toyota had not filed
for registration of the “PRIUS” mark in India.330 Ruling in favor of the
defendant, M/S Prius Auto Industries Ltd. (Prius Auto), a local Indian
company, the court based its decision on the principle of territorial use
of trademarks.331 The defendant registered the mark in 2002 and used it
continuously since the year 2001.332
The Indian Supreme Court relied on the United Kingdom
Supreme Court’s decision in Starbucks v. British Sky Broadcasting,
which found that “no trader can complain of passing-off as against him
in any territory. . . . in which he has no customers, nobody who is in
trade relation with him.”333 Based on this, the Supreme Court of India
noted that the overwhelming global judicial and academic opinions
favored the territoriality principle, which requires the court to
determine if there has been any spill-over reputation and goodwill
associated with the use of the mark of the claimant.334
India continues to undergo changes after the Prius decision, which
is a landmark decision. For example, in July 2018, the Delhi High Court
issued a permanent injunction against a retailer for infringing the famed
“Red Sole” trademark of Christian Loubutin, recognizing the wellknown mark status of the Loubutin mark.335 In this case, the mark was
registered in India.336 Interestingly, this order is in diametric opposition
to the one taken by another judge of the same court, Justice Valmiki
Mehta, in May of 2018.337 Justice Mehta held that Christian Loubutin’s
“Red Sole” trademark was not eligible for trademark protection
(Louboutin-2), although the denial focused on the question of

Id. ¶¶ 3, 19.
Id. ¶ 19.
331 Katherine Lyon Dayton, India: Supreme Court Applies Territoriality Principle and
Eviscerates Toyota’s Prius Victory, MONDAQ (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.mondaq.com/india/
trademark/691640/supreme-court-applies-territoriality-principle-and-eviscerates-toyota39sprius-victory [https://perma.cc/87N8-NMRB].
332 Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha, 2 SCC 1, at ¶ 5.
333 Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Starbucks (HK) Ltd. v. British Sky Broad. Grp. PLC & Ors., [2015] UKSC
31).
334 Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
335 Christian Louboutin SAS v. Ashish Bansal & Anr., (2018) CS (COMM) 503/2016, ¶ 9
(India). See generally Manu Sebastian, Delhi HC Grants Rs.20 Lakhs to Christian Louboutin for
Trademark Infringement of “Red Sole” [Read Judgment], LIVE L. (July 31, 2018, 11:42 PM),
https://www.livelaw.in/delhi-hc-grants-rs-20-lakhs-to-christian-louboutin-for-trademarkinfringement-of-red-sole-read-judgment [https://perma.cc/Z832-HDCU].
336 Christian Louboutin SAS, CS (COMM) 503/2016, ¶ 2.
337 Christian Louboutin SAS v. Abubaker & Ors., (2018) CS (COMM) 890/2018, ¶ 22
(India).
329
330
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registration of a color mark rather than the question of territoriality or
that of well-known marks.338
D.

Abuse of TRIPS

India’s zeal to recognize every “foreign” mark as famous just
because it is foreign is a classic example of how the TRIPS framework
has been used in the name of globalization, development, or market
integrity by organized forces from the developed world to influence
judicial and social-political processes in a manner that spews outcomes
that are contrary to the spirit of the agreement. Ruth Okediji asserts:
[An] alliance of activists, scholars and organizations . . . promotes
strategies to resist deterministic outcomes of global IP norms. In so
doing, many of the alliance’s chief protagonists . . . seek to influence
domestic political processes that are inordinately influenced by the
economic claims of industries whose business income flow
principally from an expansive trough of IP rights.339

Consequently, the TRIPS Agreement has contributed to the
emergence of expertise of harmonization in both the developed and the
developing world. The messiahs of such harmonization for the
developed world typically focus on a legal outcome, whether statutory,
judicial, or regulatory, that strictly conforms with an expansive view of
the agreement as read by industries and completely dissociating the
social and political costs to local industries and people. This group
exploits its position as the messiahs of the developed world to get access
to both corrupt or incompetent politicians, lawyers, legislators,
regulators, and bureaucrats to propound and establish theories that are
inherently disconnected with local realities.
As Ruth Okediji rightly notes, “In developing countries, the rise of
a veritable cottage industry of TRIPS professionals endeavoring to
shape national legal regimes to ensure TRIPS compliance also
succeeded, in a few cases, in inducing the creation of new IP
bureaucracies where none previously existed, or in greatly expanding
those that did.”340

338 See Balu Nair, Delhi HC Awards Punitive Damages for Infringement of Christian
Louboutin’s Red Sole Trademark, SPICYIP (Aug. 8, 2018), https://spicyip.com/2018/08/delhi-hcawards-punitive-damages-for-infringement-of-christian-louboutins-red-sole-trademark.html.
[https://perma.cc/HJQ6-D2HS].
339 Okediji, supra note 41, at 194.
340 Id. at 198.
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Further, Professor Okediji notes:
Private industry consultants, technical assistance programs funded
from the public purses of the U.S. and European Union, and training
programs by the WTO and the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) established a cultural and legal orientation
about IP that emphasized particular interpretations of TRIPS and
sought to strengthen national enforcement prospects of the
Agreement.341

Another significant abusive distortion of the TRIPS Agreement has
been the emergence of this fetish towards a global view in the
developing world which has sometimes, such as in the case of
recognition of famous foreign marks in India, distorted the limits of
trade obligation and erased the lines between the national and the
global.342 Not just India, and not just in the case of recognition of
famous marks, there is a tendency in the developing world to generally
view international obligations in a highly expansive manner with
disregard of local impact and realities and with a singular purpose of
promoting private business interests in the name of the TRIPS
agreement and international obligations.
Ruth Okediji highlights:
[T]here is growing evidence that a range of countries are responding
to TRIPS-related pressures by explicitly embracing, and then
creatively limiting, the price that a maximalist global IP regime can
exact from citizens and the policy costs it imposes on
governments. . . . [T]hese initiatives potentiate human development
returns that extend beyond the creative incentives of IP rights to
include recognition of new social freedoms, the hardening of
equality principles in local laws, judicial independence, and a general
democratic largesse.343

The interesting aspect of this is that, even taking the narrow issue
of well-known marks, “plenty of marks that are in use within the United
States that may not qualify as famous under the Trademarks Dilution
statute of the United States” have been deemed as well-known in India,
even though the product was not marketed in India.344 Although, the
most illogical aspect is the repeated designation of Indians who travel
abroad or use the Internet alone as a representative class of the larger

Id.
The distortion is most apparent in the case of issues relating to pharmaceuticals. But, the
USTR Special 301 Reports increase the pressure to conform. See generally id. See also RAGAVAN,
supra note 37.
343 Okediji, supra note 41, at 199.
344 Ragavan, supra note 3, at 362.
341
342
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one billion Indian market to determine if a foreign mark is well-known
nationally.345
Neither the United States nor its courts, regulatory agencies, or
administrative agencies engage in in-depth soul-searching to
accommodate international obligations while interpreting domestic
statutes.346 Thus, naturally, it would be wise for developing countries to
follow the United States approach in such areas, where the tendency is
to focus on the domestic rather than the global impact of obligations.
As Okediji says, the “U.S. policy in these areas is far less maximalist than
what some least-developed countries have been led to implement as
TRIPS-compliant legislation.”347 If India chooses to emulate the United
States, it does not have to recognize every foreign mark as famous just
because it is “foreign.” Perhaps, the Prius decision was the first step
towards such a sane approach.348
CONCLUSION
Going back to the scenario in the Introduction, after analyzing the
Indian and American trademark posture on well-known marks,
chances of success for Ms. Patel, who appropriated the Nilgiris mark,
are high, especially in the light of the ITC v. Punchgini decision.349
Additionally, chances of Starbucks in India shutting down are high,
even if the original Starbucks was not present in India and did not use
advertisements or register the mark in India.350
It would be desirable for the United States to either take a clear
legislative stand or resolve the currently prevailing circuit conflict,
should the opportunity present itself. To the extent that the United
States prioritizes use-based territoriality doctrines, perhaps the USTR
should recalibrate its stance accordingly. In any case, in a globalized
world where the United States has a belligerent posture in trade, as it
does currently, it may not be long before other countries learn to extend
the exact same treatment to famous American trademarks. Further, the
345 See, e.g., Centron Indus. All. Ltd. v. Gillette U.K. Ltd., (1986) SCC Online BOM 350, ¶ 7
(India) (highlighting an instance where the court took “judicial notice” of the “large number of
Indians” who traveled abroad).
346 Okediji, supra note 41, at 201 (commenting that United States courts or agencies rarely
engage in meaningful analyses of international obligations in interpreting domestic IP
doctrines).
347 Id.
348 Ragavan, supra note 3, at 361.
349 See generally ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
350 See Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. M/S Prius Auto Indus. Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1, ¶ 10
(India). That may change quickly in light of the Toyota Prius decision. Id.
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decision of ITC v. Punchgini351 shows that overreliance on use-based
territoriality rule, without a well-known marks exception, would
promote consumer confusion and fraud.352
As a general rule, when developing countries make jurisprudential
exceptions to recognize well-known marks that have long courted
markets other than their own, it sets a bad precedent for the business
world. In essence, it erodes the incentive for brand owners to mark their
presence in that country at the earliest opportunity. After all, if a
company can acquire private property rights without investing, using,
advertising, or being economically engaged in a market, where is the
incentive to invest in that market at the earliest opportunity? Hence, it
would be wise for developing countries, such as India, to ensure that
there is full reciprocity from the other members of the WTO before they
make exceptions for the private property owners of other countries.
That is, when a famous mark of a member is recognized in India, it
would be good for India to ensure that the member country extends the
same level of reciprocity for Indian well-known marks in their
jurisdiction. Although India may be well within its rights to go beyond
TRIPS and recognize famous foreign marks without seeking use or
promotion of the mark locally, it may have to carefully weigh the
different legal doctrines that govern this area and determine what would
be beneficial to the country.

351
352

ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d at 159–60.
See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2004).

